

MINISTRY OF EDUCATION AND SCIENCE OF UKRAINE
 SUMY STATE UNIVERSITY
 Educational and Scientific Institute of Business, Economics and Management
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MASTER'S LEVEL QUALIFICATION PAPER

on the topic «Diplomatic relations between Ukraine and Germany: an economic aspect»

Specialty 292 "International Economic Relations"

Student 2 Course _____ Alina Liashenko
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Group ME-m.01an

Applied for a master`s degree.

Master's level degree qualification paper contains the results of own research. The use of the ideas, results and texts of other authors has a link to the corresponding source _____ Alina Liashenko.
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Sumy, 2021

SUMMARY

of Master's level degree qualification paper

on the theme

“ DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS BETWEEN UKRAINE AND GERMANY: AN
ECONOMIC ASPECT”

student Alina Liashenko

The content of the qualification work is presented on 75 pages, including a list of used sources of 26 titles, which is placed on 3 pages.

Key words : DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS, GERMANY, FOREIGN MARKET, COMPETITIVE ABILITY, UKRAINE, ECONOMICS.

The purpose of this work is to study the theoretical foundations and to develop practical recommendations for improving bilateral relationships between Ukraine and Germany, its diplomatic and foreign economic activity development.

The object of the study is to study the theoretical foundations and develop practical recommendations for improving Ukraine's competitive position in the development of foreign economic activity with Germany activity.

The subject of the study is searching of ways of relations improvement in economic aspect between Ukraine and Germany.

To achieve this goal, the following methods were used: scientific and theoretical analysis of economic condition, comparison methods etc.

The information base of the qualification paper is scientific publications, monographs, official websites of the Embassy of Germany in Ukraine etc.

The main scientific results are as follows :

- 1) The author of the diploma work investigates the concepts “diplomats”, “bilateral relations” in terms of international bussines and trade.
- 2) Systemaization of approaches to improve connection between Ukraine and Germany.

3) Profound analysis of the import and export goods with mater to improve an economic aspect of cooperation.

The obtained results can be used by all whom have bussines relationships with Germany during planning and formation of economic and management policy to improve the competitiveness of export and import goods.

Year of qualification work – 2021

Year of protection of work – 2021

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TASKS FOR MASTER'S LEVEL DEGREE QUALIFICATION PAPER
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Chapter 1 deals with : Consider Ukraine and Germany in diplomatic relations with countries of the world. Study Ukraine in bilateral relations with countries of the world

Investigate diplomatic missions of Germany (title, the deadline for submission
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Analysis of economic cooperation between Ukraine and Germany .Cooperation in the field of culture, science and technic and interaction with the Ukrainian community.

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INTRODUCTION

Germany is one of Ukraine's closest neighbors in the European Union and an important and reliable partner on the road to Europe. The Federal Republic provides the largest bilateral assistance after the United States and is Ukraine's most important trading partner after Russia. For Germany, Ukraine is the cornerstone of the European security architecture, a country with which it has maintained ties since the days of Kievan Rus. Germany is represented in Ukraine by a large group of people, mostly ethnic Germans, some of whom live and will always live in Ukraine. There is also a close network of political, economic, cultural and private ties between the two countries, with a significant share of the federal states and communities of Germany.

At the present stage, the development of bilateral relations occupies an important place in the system of Ukraine's foreign policy. The diplomatic service of independent Ukraine has gone through a thorny and difficult path of its formation on the world stage, starting with the recognition of Ukraine's independence as the world's leading country in 1991 and ending with good neighborly, friendly and strategic diplomatic relations.

The history and current state of Ukraine's bilateral relations are covered in this paper.

The purpose of the master's level is to study the theoretical foundations and develop practical recommendations for improving Ukraine's competitive position in the development of foreign economic activity with Germany.

The object of study is the system of economic relations in the process of forming diplomatic and economic relations between Ukraine and Germany, which carries out international economic activity.

The subject of the study is to find ways to increase the competitive position of the company in international markets by expanding the range of products to meet the needs and requirements of the end consumer.

To achieve this goal and objectives, the following scientific research methods were used: systematization and generalization (theoretically - the concept of competitiveness), comparison (in the process of identifying common and different advantages of the largest competitors of the dairy).

The object of study is the diplomatic, economic and cultural relations between Ukraine and Germany.

1. UKRAINE AND GERMANY IN DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS WITH COUNTRIES OF THE WORLD

1.1 Ukraine in bilateral relations with countries of the world

Ukraine's foreign policy has a strategic approach to relations with foreign countries, cooperation with international organizations, promotion of its national interests and protection of the rights of its citizens and the Ukrainian diaspora abroad. It is an interesting fact that, Ukraine's foreign policy strategic goal is European and Euro-Atlantic integration, which strategic partnership relations formation with the European Union, the United States, active work in the UN and other international organizations, ensuring effective participation in the world economy with maximum protection of national interests. the state.Ukraine is guided by numbers of key priorities in foreign policy.

A realistic definition of Ukraine's foreign policy priorities and ways to achieve them is a necessary conditions, persistent promotion and protection of the country's national interests. This definition involves understanding the place of the Ukrainian state in the world, its perception by other states, analysis of current world trends, awareness of challenges and prospects in various fields. Given that Ukraine has long had no clearly articulated foreign policy priorities other than European and Euro-Atlantic integration, there is a need for a systematic and comprehensive definition of Ukraine's priorities, which countries or issues are promising for cooperation, and what challenges are needed. due attention from the Ukrainian state and its representatives responsible for the formation and implementation of foreign policy.

Ukraine belongs to the Emerging and Developing Europe group according to the International Monetary Fund classification, which includes 16 countries, both

members of the EU and members of the Eastern Partnership. Ukraine's GDP in 2019 is \$ 150 billion US, which is 0.3% of world GDP. Occupying 32nd place in the world in terms of population and 47th in terms of area, what is rich in natural resources, Ukraine ranks only 55th in world trade, which, according to international organizations and financial institutions, indicates inefficient use of existing potential and opportunities. The level of GDP per capita is penultimate among European countries. The aggravating factor is the forced high defense spending caused by the aggression of the Russian Federation (5% of GDP, 14th place in the world). An encouraging factor is the high level of education and access to the Internet - 29th place in the world.

Also, you may know that, Ukraine is a responsible member of international organizations, has long been a leader among the contributors to peacekeeping operations, is one of the leaders in exporting grain, metallurgical and aerospace products, defense cooperation and arms trade. By the way, the experience gained during the years of the Russian-Ukrainian conflict, in particular, in counteracting new challenges, hybrid threats, cyberattacks and information operations, is an important factor in security and political cooperation with the world. Ukraine is shaping its foreign policy in the conditions complex transformation of the liberal world order that emerged after World War II. First of all, this transformation involves a rethinking of the world's leading states of their priorities, the conceptual foundations of interstate cooperation; completion of the transition from a bipolar to a multipolar world in the context of economic globalization; increase in the security deficit associated with the escalation of terrorism, extremism, and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. In addition, when determining the priorities of Ukraine's foreign policy, it is important to understand the global trends, processes and crises that determine the current state of international relations and will affect the formation of Ukraine's foreign policy in the medium term. In particular, these include:

- Trends:

- The global leadership crisis. In particular, there is competition in different parts of the world for regional leadership, as well as declining confidence in the United States and other global players.
- Unprecedented growth of inequality both within individual societies and between countries and regions, which leads to protests and violent confrontation, which often results in changes in ruling regimes.
- Total loss of mutual trust: voters, with rare exceptions, do not trust political parties and governments, countries - each other, members of the world community - international organizations. As a result, nationalist, right-wing and left-wing populist movements are on the rise at the domestic level, even in countries with strong democratic traditions. At the foreign policy level, there is a decline in the role of international institutions and respect for international commitments.
- Technological development, which, on the one hand, provides a transition to a new industrial system, and on the other - creates a new field for aggressive action, on the verge of war, and socially - virtualizes the lives of individuals, societies and countries.
- A new stage in the struggle for resources (Africa and the Arctic). Among the key players - China, USA, EU, Russia, Turkey.

- Crises:

It is interesting fact that, which may arise from the 2008 model due to trade disputes between the United States and China and the United States and the European Union the continuing threat of an economic crisis. The world is objectively experiencing a crisis of inequality, when an absolute minority of the world's population has an absolute majority of social wealth.

- Security crises in the Middle East, in particular in Syria, Libya, Yemen, the confrontation between the Sunni monarchies of the Gulf and Iran, the continuation of the Arab-Israeli confrontation.

- Exacerbation of the conflict in Nagorno Karabakh and deterioration of the security situation in the Caucasus in general.
- The crisis of the European project, which, in particular, is due to the refugee problem, Brexit, the growing influence of populist movements and right-wing political forces, inconsistencies in EU enlargement and deepening cooperation within the European Union.
- Economic crisis due to the Covid-19 pandemic and global lockdown.
- Security crisis around the DPRK and its nuclear program.
- The crisis in Hong Kong and threats in the South China Sea due to Chinese policy.
- The crisis over Iran's nuclear program, the return of the United States to the anti-Iranian sanctions regime, the actual resumption of uranium enrichment in IRI.
- The political crisis in Belarus as a result of the 2020 presidential election.
- The crisis in the Eastern Mediterranean and the escalation of the confrontation between Greece and Turkey.
- The global health infrastructure crisis.

The processes of European integration have stimulated the high dynamics of regional cooperation between the countries of Western and Northern Europe in recent decades. Political and economic cooperation between the countries of the region is conditioned by their membership in the European Union. Non-EU Norway and Iceland remain in the single economic and legal space of the United Europe due to their participation in the internal market of the European Union and the Schengen area. Regional international organizations such as the Nordic Council, the Arctic Council, the Barents / Euro-Arctic Council (ERB), the Arctic Economic Council, and the Northern Dimension policy play an important role in ensuring the sustainable development of the polar regions, the environment and business development. Norway, Iceland, the Russian Federation), numerous initiatives based on public organizations and educational institutions. Given the

aggravation of the security situation in the Baltic region, the format of intergovernmental cooperation between the North Baltic Eight (NB8), which includes the Baltic and Scandinavian countries, is becoming relevant. The leading position in ensuring the security of the region belongs to the North Atlantic Alliance. Russia's policy of containment has given additional impetus to the deepening of defense cooperation between Western and Northern Europe. The Convention component is being "refined" within the NATO Very High Readiness Joint Task Force (VJTF) and the NATO Response Force (NRF). In addition, the subregional armies of the subregion ensure the presence of NATO international battalions in Lithuania (commanded by Germany, consisting of troops from Belgium, Iceland, Luxembourg, Norway, the Netherlands) and Estonia (the unit is led by the United Kingdom in the United Kingdom and Britain, Estonia). Northern European Defense Cooperation (NORDEF) is still relevant. The ambivalent stance of the US administration on European security, NATO's inability to define a clear strategy for the Arctic, Sweden's and Finland's policy of non-alignment - all these factors are relevant to NORDEF's interaction today in the new realities. Common approaches to defense policy in Northern Europe have changed significantly in 2014-2015. The regional vector of the confrontation between Russia and the West was a significant increase in tensions in the Baltic region. The deteriorating security situation has intensified discussions in Swedish and Finnish societies about NATO membership in order to protect against Russian expansionism.

The defense doctrines of Sweden and Finland pay great attention to the development of territorial defense and civil defense. A key aspect of the joint exercise between the Swedish and Finnish Armed Forces and Allied Allies is to increase the mobility of NATO troops across both countries under the Host Nation Support (HNS). Politicians in both countries, where the majority does not support NATO membership, are not pushing the "Atlantic agenda", but attitudes towards the Alliance are slowly improving.

The countries of the subregion do not focus on the local security dimension, as evidenced by active participation in UN peacekeeping missions and EU civilian missions. Most of them also joined the Coalition of the European Armed Forces (European Intervention Initiative, "EI2"), created at the initiative of French President Macron. This process is a testament to how the UK's exit from the EU and the controversy between Berlin and Washington (particularly on defense spending) are stimulating the search for new formats of security cooperation. The Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) program has given impetus to cooperation in the defense industry in Western and Northern Europe. Despite the common geographical area and security challenges, there are still differences between Western and Northern European countries in setting priorities at the international level.

Countries of western and northern Europe: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Iceland, Luxembourg, Norway, the Netherlands, Germany, the Republic of Ireland, Finland, Switzerland, Sweden. The focus of Oslo and Copenhagen is the Far North, for Stockholm and Helsinki the cornerstone of foreign policy is neutrality. London is committed to strengthening the transatlantic partnership as a key to addressing regional military and energy risks. Berlin and the capitals of the Benelux countries are focusing on reforming the defense policy of the European Union. The influence of global actors is defined primarily as follows: The United States is interested in maintaining military and political influence in the region and curbing dependence on Russian energy supplies to Western and Northern Europe. At the same time, a certain element of discord in their relations is the introduction and increase of import duty rates on a number of goods from the EU, which are introduced by the United States.

Also, as an element of pressure to increase security spending, the US administration may use the European Reassurance Initiative (ERI) to reduce funding. The attitude of the US administration towards environmental protection contrasts sharply with the ecological discourse in the countries of the subregion.

US-Danish misunderstandings over the "acquisition of Greenland" have not affected relations between the parties, there are plans to build another US air base on the island.

Russian Federation is trying to strengthen its status as an exporter of energy resources, pushing the United States out of the European market. The Nord Stream-2 gas pipeline is a key tool for gaining new positions on the region's energy map. Denmark became the only country that until recently did not allow the laying of pipes in its territorial waters, but changed its position in October 2019. Another problematic case in Danish-Russian relations is the dispute over the continental shelf in the Arctic. Nevertheless, the interest in the Arctic is due to the high intensity of cooperation between the Nordic countries and Russia at the subregional level, despite the general atmosphere of lack of confidence and sanctions policy pursued by the countries of the region. Among the projects that are actively developing and will continue to affect the political and economic landscape of the region, the Baltic Pipeline should be mentioned, which will connect the gas transmission systems of Denmark and Poland.

According to forecasts, construction will be completed in 2022. Among the most pressing threats to stability in the region is the possibility of escalation in the military situation.¹⁴ In April 2019, the UN subcommittee preliminarily approved the application of Russia (Moscow is trying to prove that Lomonosov's underwater ridge is a continuation of the Eurasian continent and, accordingly, continental shelf in the Arctic). There is a high probability that in the next few UN sessions the issue will be resolved in favor of Moscow. settlements of the Russian Federation in the Arctic region and in the Baltic Sea. There is still a possibility of a military incident due to Russia's violation of the air or sea space of a NATO member state and the intensification of submarine reconnaissance. The Russian side is reacting sharply to the modernization and reconstruction of NATO's military infrastructure in Norway.

The practice of the Northern Fleet of the Russian Federation to conduct exercises with combat fire off the coast of Norway, injecting an atmosphere of conflict around the Svalbard archipelago is a form of pressure on the neighboring country. The latter factor highlights the cooperation between the United States, Denmark and Iceland to strengthen counterintelligence capabilities on the Faroe-Iceland border ("GIUK gap"). At the same time, the reduction of the Arctic ice cover will increase the chances of detecting Russian submarines in the medium term (next 10-15 years).

In the cyberspace of Russia also distinguished itself by provocative actions. Hacker groups affiliated with Russia, involved in hacking the e-mail accounts of military and government officials, recorded attempts to steal diplomatic correspondence, and so on.

The issue of maintaining the sanctions regime against the Russian Federation also remains problematic. The de facto easing of economic restrictions on Russia has become a given, given the growing investment of German companies in the Russian economy. In the first quarter of 2019, German companies invested 1.8 billion euros in Russia's economy, a third more than last year. Last year, German companies invested 3.2 billion euros in Russia, a record for the last 10 years.

If we take the issue of NATO and the EU, it should be emphasized once again that Zelensky was not elected president on pro-Russian and anti-Maidan slogans. And most of his electorate is in favor of integration into both the EU and NATO. Democratic Initiatives Foundation Ilka Kucheriva conducted a nationwide poll in December with the KIIS, and it showed that the majority of Ukrainians continue to support the EU and NATO. Moreover, even among the "Servants of the People" 51% are in favor of Ukraine's integration into NATO as a means of security, although 32% are in favor of a non-aligned direction.

You may know that, in the electorate of the Motherland 30% - also for non-aligned status. It is possible not to speak about OPZZh, here everything is clear.

But still, the electorate of both European Solidarity, the Motherland and the Servants of the People is dominated by NATO and EU supporters. This is obviously one of the safeguards to prevent the country from turning in the opposite direction.

In the direction of NATO, it would be best for us to obtain a NATO Membership Action Plan (MAP). We are now enrolled in the Enhanced Opportunities Partnership (ENP) program. This is not a bad thing, but of course it is not a MAP, and some NATO countries may say - you have received an ESA, why do you need a MAP. For Kyiv, ESD cannot be a substitute for the MAP, but it is also an opportunity to deepen relations with NATO, so we must use them.

It seems that in 2021 Georgia is more likely to receive a MAP than Ukraine. But if this happens, do not sprinkle your head with ashes. Because if the Georgians get the MAP, having territorial problems (because Russia has recognized the so-called independence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia), it will be a precedent that the problems of separatism, supported by Moscow, will not hinder Ukraine's progress towards NATO.

If we talk about the European Union, the EU-Ukraine summit held in October this year in Brussels showed positive results. Kyiv has solved two important tasks formulated by the Ukrainian expert community and which, by the way, it was not clear until the last minute whether it will be possible to achieve. The parties agreed that the renewal of the Association Agreement could begin. Why is this important? Because this agreement was being prepared before 2014 - it was initialed, ie agreed, in 2012. And it is obvious that during this time some things there have become obsolete. They need to be updated. The second point was that an agreement was reached at the summit that negotiations on so-called industrial visa-free travel should begin. In this case, Ukrainian products will not require additional certification in the EU. This will make life easier for Ukrainian exporters and will be an important step forward.

Exactly, in the European direction, "not everything is gone." We can say that there were mixed signals from the president's team. One says - yes, the other - no, periodically that we do not meet the criteria set by the EU and NATO. But in the end, all the key actors worked together: the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (headed by Dmytro Kuleba), Deputy Prime Minister for European and Euro-Atlantic Integration Olga Stefanyshyn, and Deputy Head of International Affairs Igor Zhovkva. As a result, if we talk about real steps, we have even managed to strengthen this direction.

American direction. The year 2020 began with an attempt to impeach Trump. And Ukraine was heard here in a negative context, but despite the mistakes made by Zelensky and Yermak in 2019, Kyiv still managed to move away from involving the country in the domestic political race in the United States. Biden's victory creates opportunities for further development of Ukraine-US relations and greater stability, because Trump was more unpredictable. At the same time, Biden will pay more attention than Trump to the reforms taking place in Ukraine.

Democratic Initiatives Foundation Ilka Kucheriva conducted an expert poll Political Quarter: Results of 2020, which highlighted three events in 2021, the probability of which, according to experts, more than 50%. These include rallies and protests in connection with the lockdown, the medical collapse due to the pandemic. At the same time, 56% of experts called the resumption of cooperation between Ukraine and the IMF likely. And this is a positive thing for the country, despite the imposition of the thesis of Ukraine's external governance. And this thesis is used by both pro-Russian and populist forces, both left and right. In the context of resuming cooperation with the IMF, an agreement has already been invited to the United States to appoint Oksana Markarova Ambassador of Ukraine to Washington. She is not a staff diplomat, but there are political appointees among the diplomats. Markarova knows how to cooperate in the financial and economic spheres, and now she needs to gain diplomatic experience. Among the achievements are the establishment of the Lublin Triangle with Poland and

Lithuania, the development of relations with Turkey (including in the military sphere). The situation with Hungary remains tense, but it is not Zelensky's fault. Dmytro Kuleba is constantly negotiating on this issue. Hungary's NATO partners do not support Budapest's position and encourage it to engage in dialogue with Kyiv. An unconditional positive is the signing of the Agreement on Political Cooperation, Free Trade and Strategic Partnership with the United Kingdom, which is one of Kyiv's most reliable partners. Here is a paradox for you: Great Britain cannot agree with the European Union, but it has agreed with us. On the positive side: active discussion of the idea of the Crimean platform. However, the prospects depend not only on Ukraine, but also on our international partners. That work is underway, and one of the possible dates for the launch of the Crimean platform is in May, just before the anniversary of the deportation of Crimean Tatars. As for Belarus, in the December Deminitiative poll, the coronavirus was among the most important events in the world (30% of respondents), and 16% said about the civil protests in Belarus. At the beginning, official Kyiv was a little late with the reaction. This was a restrained and expectant position. But Ukraine soon joined the EU. Radical rhetoric was not used, but from a diplomatic point of view everything is said - Kyiv does not recognize Lukashenko as president. The most problematic part is our relations with Russia and the unjustified concessions that Kyiv can make. At the beginning of the year, there was even talk of restoring water supply to Crimea, but thanks to the harsh reaction of society and the opposition, Ukraine has retained this powerful tool of pressure on Russia. Last December, the Normandy summit outlined the possibility of unblocking the dialogue on Donbass, and then everything rested on negotiations with Moscow. These talks have shown that the Kremlin remains completely in its old position. Even a truce (although it is good) is fragile. The shelling continues, there are losses. And Putin can interrupt him at any time, as soon as he feels that he needs to increase the pressure on the Ukrainian side. After Zelensky came to power, the idea of UN peacekeepers was pushed to the background. For Ukraine, the deployment of UN peacekeepers in the

occupied territories would be an optimal scenario. It is difficult to implement, because Russia has a veto in the UN Security Council, but at least Kyiv did not have to push it away as a trump card in the negotiations. Now they are talking about it again, but when it comes to Plan B, it is unclear what the Ukrainian government means. There have been several attempts this year to legitimize direct talks with the militants. March 11 - initialing of the document by Ermak and Kuchma together with the "authorized representatives" of ORDLO on the establishment of the so-called advisory council on ORDLO. In August, there was an attempt to inspect Ukrainian positions in Shumy, where a representative of the so-called DNR was to take part. It is good that this attempt was also broken. But these are two very alarming signals, because the main thing for Russia is to legitimize the militants. And here the position of the Office of the President and its head Andriy Yermak, which took over the issues of Russia and Donbass, is unclear. Such a new form as "statements of the OPU", which explain the main issues of domestic and foreign policy, is unclear. It is unclear why Ermak's adviser, political scientist Podoliak, is explaining. In fact, when it comes to foreign policy, the Foreign Ministry should do it. Therefore, there are great dangers.

In general, the situation in Donbass looks like this: President Zelensky approached the red line several times, as if crossing it, but then there was public opposition, and official Kyiv is reversing. And why are we approaching this line? And is it possible to stop Zelensky from dramatic steps? Zelensky's team is still aware of the risks of crossing the red line, and they are eventually forced to return to the traditional position of Ukrainian diplomacy, which is that first security, and only then - political concessions. This is the line pursued by Petro Poroshenko and Pavlo Klimkin. It is clear that when we read Zelensky's speeches, Ermak's column, everything falls on those who signed the Minsk agreements. But in reality it turns out that first the illusions of the new government, and then return to the line of traditional diplomacy.

So when we talk about Donbass, the main thing is to be realistic. Putin will not make any concessions if Kyiv is not strong and if there is no support from our international partners. We must have a clear position, sanctions must continue, and it is important to take public opinion into account, not to speculate on it. Because even in the so-called Zelensky poll, when it came to the free economic zone in the Donbass, this issue has split society, and even the electorate "Servants of the People" does not stand for peace at any cost. And this should be a deterrent.

1.2. Diplomatic missions of Germany

The Federal Republic of Germany (Germany) is a Central European country and a member of the European Union, G4, G7, G20, Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). It develops a network of 229 diplomatic missions abroad and maintains relations with more than 190 countries. As one of the leading industrial countries in the world, recognized as a leading state in European and world affairs. Currently, 159 countries have embassies in Germany, some of which also have other diplomatic and consular missions.

Germany is a member of the Council of Europe, the European Union, the European Space Agency, the G4, G7, the International Monetary Fund, NATO, the OECD, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, the United Nations, the World Bank Group and the World Trade Organization.

- European Union

European integration has come a long way since the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) and the Elysee Treaty. Peaceful cooperation with its

neighbors remains one of Germany's greatest political goals, and Germany ranks first among most achievements of European integration:

- Maastricht Treaty
- Germany seeks to maintain peace by "deepening" integration among current members of the European Union
- European Defense Forces
- Introduction of the single currency € Euro
- Germany has been the largest net payer of EU budgets for decades and seeks to limit the growth of these net payments in the enlarged union.
- European Constitution

- NATO

According to the doctrine introduced by the 2003 Defense Policy Directives, Germany continues to give priority to the transatlantic partnership with the United States through the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. However, Germany is paying increasing attention to coordinating its policy with the European Union through the Common Foreign and Security Policy.

- UN

The German federal government has launched an initiative to gain a permanent seat on the UN Security Council as part of UN reform. This will require the approval of a two-thirds majority of Member States and the approval of all five Security Council veto powers. This aspiration could be successful thanks to Germany's good relations with the People's Republic of China and the Russian Federation. Germany is a stable and democratic republic and a G7 country, which is also its advantage. The United States is ambiguous on this issue. NATO member states, including Germany, have decided not to sign the UN Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons, which is a binding agreement for negotiations on

the complete elimination of nuclear weapons, supported by more than 120 countries.

The urgency of the topic is determined by the fact that Germany today plays the role of one of the leaders in Europe, has access to decision-making at the international level and is the initiator of many projects that are important for maintaining peace and security in the world. Since the existence of a modern developed state is impossible without cooperation with other states, international cooperation, as part of Germany's European policy, as an indicator of a state with a high level of development, is important to study today.

Germany cooperates with other countries by participating in international organizations. In particular, Germany is a member of the European Union, the United Nations, NATO, the OSCE, the WTO, the IMF and others.

In 1957, Germany was one of the six founders of the current EU. Germany's contribution to the EU budget (141 billion euros) is 26.6 billion euros (2010). Günther Oettinger (CDU) is the former Prime Minister of Baden-Württemberg and has been responsible for the EU Energy Commission since 9 February 2010. In 2004, Germany's fourth non-permanent membership of the UN Security Council ended after the country joined the organization in 1973. To bring the UN into line with today's political realities, Germany advocates reform of the organization. Since 1996, Germany, the third largest contributor to the UN budget, has been one of the countries where UN bodies are located: in particular, the Secretariat of the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change is located in Bonn. The Security Council has the primary responsibility for maintaining peace and international security. Germany has always sought to make the work of the Security Council effective and transparent. During the German presidency in 2003–2004, the Security Council adopted Resolution 1540 to prevent non-state actors from accessing weapons of mass destruction. In addition, Germany has initiated a debate on how the private sector can play a key role in conflict prevention and peace-building. In 2011-2012, Germany aims to become a reliable partner that will meet

its own requirements for greater transparency; will support initiatives aimed at strengthening peace and security; promote economic and social equality; seeks to address global issues such as climate change, resource scarcity and food crises.

In February 2011, the German government and the Norwegian government promised to allocate \$ 5 million. The United States to finance the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO) program to reduce greenhouse gas emissions related to the agricultural sector. Agriculture together accounts for about one-third of greenhouse gas emissions. Germany has allocated \$ 2 million to combat greenhouse gas emissions in the agricultural sector. USA .

Other important elements of Germany's UN policy include strengthening international law, protecting human rights and protecting the environment. When UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon visited Berlin in 2007 and 2008, Chancellor Angela Merkel and Foreign Minister Frank-Walter Steinmeier assured him of Germany's continued support for the United Nations.

Germany has been a member of NATO since 1955. After German reunification in 1990, the former East Germany became part of NATO. Today, about 5,000 German soldiers serve under the NATO flag. The Bundeswehr has been involved in the NATO-led mission in Kosovo since March 1999, as well as in the NATO-led ISAF operation in Afghanistan.

Today, Germany is committed to nuclear disarmament within NATO, supporting the introduction of a new missile defense system in Europe to remove about 200 tactical nuclear bombs across the continent.

The World Trade Organization (WTO) is designed to support the implementation of existing international trade agreements and is a forum for negotiations on the liberalization of world trade, founded in 1995. Within the WTO, Germany is strongly in favor of more active involvement of developing countries in world trade.

In March 2011, Germany offered € 1 million to the WTO as part of a training program for developing countries. Germany is one of the largest donors to

this fund. Taking into account recent contributions, Germany's total contribution to various WTO projects has reached 18,700,000 Swiss francs (approximately 14,500,000 euros). This grant will fund technical assistance and training programs for developing countries, least developed countries, and countries with economies in transition. The aim is to better adapt its practices and legislation, WTO rules and regulations, and to improve the implementation of obligations and the exercise of membership rights. The main task of the International Monetary Fund (IMF), based in Washington, is

Germany is a major shareholder in the International Monetary Fund, with a share of about 6 percent in its capital; Germany participates significantly in the decision-making of the institution. Thus, Germany, which is a member of various international organizations, is a valuable international partner, due to the not least role of Germany in providing contributions in the form of capital, technology, workers and intellectual resources. Within the framework of international organizations, Germany participates in many activities to overcome the global problems of mankind at the present stage and promotes the development of relations with various countries around the world. Thus, with its unification, the Federal Republic of Germany not only gained state sovereignty, but also set out to build a new model of world politics. By pursuing its own European policy through international cooperation, Germany has gained the trust of other countries in the world and has assumed responsibility for maintaining peace and security in the world. The directions of its policy are Germany's support for the further integration of European countries into the EU and the development of multi-vector relations between them. By participating in various international organizations, it contributes to the solution of global economic, environmental and political issues, energy resources and climate, as well as supports the development of equal and democratic relations with all countries.

Germany is actively and multifacetedly integrated into world politics. The country maintains diplomatic relations with almost 200 countries and is a member

of various multilateral organizations and informal international coordination groups, such as the Group of Seven (G7). Heiko Maas (SPD) has been the Minister of Foreign Affairs since 2018. The foreign ministry, headquartered in Berlin, employs about 12,100 people. In total, Germany has 227 diplomatic missions abroad.

The priority goal of German foreign policy is to maintain peace and security throughout the world. One of the main coordinates is broad integration into multilateral cooperation structures. In concrete terms, this means: constructive partnership with the member states of the European Union (EU) and transatlantic partners, advocating for Israel's right to exist, active and active participation in the work of the United Nations (UN) and the Council of Europe, as well as strengthening the European security architecture within the OSCE. In the second half of 2020, Germany will hold the EU presidency.

Together with partners, Germany stands for peace, security, democracy and human rights around the world. Germany's broader concept of security includes crisis prevention, stabilization, disarmament and arms control, as well as sustainable economic, environmental and social dimensions. This should include the process of globalization with chances for all, the protection of the environment and climate at the international level, and the dialogue between cultures and religions. After the end of the conflict between East and West, German foreign policy has new opportunities and challenges. Multilaterally integrated, Germany has assumed the increased responsibility that has befallen it since its reunification in 1990. Germany is making more and more efforts to stabilize crisis regions and politically resolve conflicts. In addition, the country participates in the work to preserve peacekeeping structures and makes a great contribution to overcoming crises, staffing various peacekeeping missions with a UN mandate.

Germany's interests are determined by basic values. Today, there is hardly a crisis, the echoes of which would not be felt in Germany. For this reason, it is in Germany's interest to always stabilize crisis countries in the long run. The compass

for Germany's actions in international crises and overcoming armed conflicts are the guidelines formulated in 2017 in the document "Preventing Crises, Managing Conflicts, Promoting Peace". After all, the recognition and elimination of conflicts before they escalate is the subject of a responsible foreign policy. German soldiers, police and civilian experts who work in missions of the EU, OSCE, UN, NATO, as well as the Council of Europe or the Organization of American States (OAS) make important contributions to crisis prevention and peacekeeping.

Germany provides humanitarian aid to support people in dire need due to crises, conflicts or natural disasters and who cannot cope with them on their own. The aim is to empower survivors to maintain their human dignity and feel safe, give them perspective and alleviate suffering. Germany relies on United Nations organizations, the Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement, and German and international humanitarian non-governmental organizations. As a principle-oriented donor, Germany is responsive to the needs of people affected by crises and natural disasters. In addition, Germany is committed to upholding international humanitarian law, humanitarian principles and protecting the humanitarian space. Aid workers must receive the protection to which they are entitled under international law.

In the era of globalization and digital development, against the backdrop of a rapidly changing classical foreign policy, new topics of digital diplomacy are on the agenda. These include, for example, preventing "malicious cyber operations" and attempts to influence public opinion through propaganda.

2. THE MAIN DIRECTIONS OF COOPERATION DEVELOPMENT BETWEEN UKRAINE AND GERMANY

2.1. Analysis of economic cooperation between Ukraine and Germany

German-Ukrainian relations did not develop intensively. For some time, Germany, together with other Western countries, considered solving European problems, as well as the formation of relations with the CIS, including Ukraine, exclusively in the context of relations with the Russian Federation. In late 1992 and early 1993, German government finally decided on the erroneous orientation of Russia and the need to consider relations with Ukraine as an independent and separate direction of German foreign policy, because without a sovereign Ukraine it is impossible to maintain the status quo in Europe. unification of Germany, the collapse of the ATS, and then - and the USSR.

Taking into account the objective state of the transition period and new geopolitical realities prompted the governmental circles of both states to form the political and legal foundations of bilateral relations. During this period, the signing of a wide range of interstate agreements began. The efforts of both sides culminated in an official visit to Kyiv by Chancellor G. Kohl at the head of a representative delegation in June 1993.

During the Chancellor's visit, a Joint Declaration on the Fundamentals of Relations between Ukraine and the Federal Republic of Germany and an Agreement on the Development of Large-Scale Cooperation in the Fields of Economy, Industry, Science and Technology were signed. They created a political and legal basis for cooperation between the two countries.

In the Joint Declaration, both sides stressed their conviction of the need to build a new, united Europe based on common values and to transform it into a

continent of peace, security and cooperation. The two countries are firmly committed to building relations on a binding international legal basis, guided by the principles of equality, non-discrimination and mutual benefit.

The Treaty on the Development of Large-scale Cooperation stated that the Contracting Parties would promote trade and cooperation between enterprises and organizations of both countries through appropriate measures on the basis of national legislation and in accordance with international obligations. The parties undertook to provide guarantees for export credits on the most favorable terms, in accordance with the principles of national and international law.

Assessing these two documents, it should be noted that to this day these two agreements continue to be the most important contractual and legal principles of German-Ukrainian cooperation.

In September 1996, G. Kohl visited Ukraine for the second time. During this visit, the two countries signed an agreement on cooperation in matters of German origin living in Ukraine, as well as a number of other bilateral documents on projects of cooperation in the economic field. The visit was marked by reconciliation and building mutual understanding between the two peoples. According to the bilateral agreement, a soldier's cemetery was opened near Kyiv, where the remains of German citizens who died in Ukraine during the Second World War are reburied. In February 1998, the Federal President of the Federal Republic of Germany, R. Herzog, paid his first state visit to Ukraine. The visit of the federal president, who plays a representative role in the political system of Germany, was of great symbolic importance. He demonstrated that Ukraine is one of Germany's partners with which it has stable ties.

Germany most strongly supports Ukraine's cooperation with European and Atlantic structures. She was actively involved in the preparation and signing of the 1994 Partnership and Cooperation Agreement with the EU and the 1997 Special Partnership Charter with NATO. Since May 1998, regular Ukrainian-German intergovernmental consultations have taken place, which have become a forum for

exchanging views on bilateral relations and resolving the most important issues of bilateral cooperation. Germany's presidency in the first half of 1999 in the EU, the WEU and the G7 created new opportunities for deepening cooperation, especially given the dynamics of European integration processes. At the beginning of July 1999, the second Ukrainian-German intergovernmental consultations at the highest level were held in Kyiv under the chairmanship of President of Ukraine Leonid Kuchma and Federal Chancellor of Germany G. Schroeder. Although the visit did not lead to the signing of significant new agreements between the two countries and revealed differences in views between the two governments on the closure of the Chernobyl nuclear power plant, it showed the unity of both sides on cooperation and security in Europe and the desire to further develop relations.

In July 2000, the third Ukrainian-German intergovernmental consultations at the highest level took place in Germany. They demonstrated the viability and effectiveness of this form of interstate cooperation.

Thanks to the hard work of the governments and diplomacies of both countries during the first decade, the political and legal framework of interstate relations was established, which includes more than two dozen bilateral treaties and agreements. However, it should be emphasized that no agreement on the basics of bilateral relations has been concluded so far, as has been the case, for example, in Germany's relations with Poland or Russia. Ukrainian-German relations are based on the Declaration we mentioned, which is quite general.

Nevertheless, it can be stated that relations with Ukraine play an important role in Germany's priorities in the East. According to the analysis of the statements of German statesmen, German government circles believe that it is necessary, based on the above strategic approaches, to help Ukraine define and strengthen its geopolitical position on two levels, ie by promoting rapprochement with the EU and NATO and subregional cooperation. primarily with Central European countries. Programs such as the Carpathian Euroregion Initiative are seen as important in terms of the possibility of a new redistribution of forces in Europe

following NATO enlargement. With their help, Ukraine will move closer to the EU and NATO through interregional cooperation.

- Economic relations

In 2007, Germany was Ukraine's second most important trading partner after Russia (7.42 billion euros) (an increase of 18.9% compared to 2006). In the field of direct investment, the Federal Republic of Germany ranks second (total investment in 2007: \$ 5.92 billion). Currently, more than 1,000 German companies are represented in Ukraine. In addition to the Embassy, their interests are also represented by the Office of the Delegate of the German Economy.

- Financial and technical cooperation

Germany has supported the reform process in Ukraine's economy under its Transform program (1993-2004: € 115 million). In March 2008, the Agreement on Financial Cooperation was signed on the basis of 2006 appropriations (funding: EUR 185 million).

- Cooperation in the field of culture

Shortly after the signing of the German-Ukrainian Agreement on Cultural Exchange (1993), the Goethe-Institut was opened in Kyiv, which became a center for promoting the study of German language and culture in Ukraine. Stakeholders can improve their education in 11 other German language centers and 4 reading rooms of the Goethe-Institut in Ukraine.

- Scientific and technical cooperation

Scientific and technological cooperation between Ukraine and Germany is based on the Joint Statement of the State Committee of Ukraine for Science and Technology and the Federal Ministry of Research and Technology of Germany on Scientific and Technical Relations of June 10, 1993, which has the status of an interagency agreement. As part of this Statement, the Ukrainian-German Working Group on Scientific and Technical Cooperation was established at the first joint meeting in Bonn in 1997. During the joint meetings, which take place every 2 years alternately in Ukraine and Germany, the issues of the state and ways of

development of bilateral cooperation are discussed. Ten meetings of the Working Group have taken place since 1997. During this period, with the support of the Ukrainian and German sides, about 160 Ukrainian-German research projects were carried out. According to the results of the last competition, 12 joint projects were implemented.

In 1998, an office of the German Academic Exchange Service (DAAD) was opened in Kyiv and a cooperation agreement was signed between higher education institutions. Currently, about 4,000 Ukrainians study at German universities, and 13 teachers from Germany work at Ukrainian universities.

- Cultural and humanitarian cooperation

The basis of the legal framework for cooperation in the field of culture is the Intergovernmental Agreement on Cooperation in the Field of Culture of February 15, 1993.

The following agreements are in force in the field of youth policy and education: the Agreement on Cooperation in the Field of Youth Policy of August 26, 1993 between the Ministry of Family and Youth Affairs of Ukraine and the Federal Ministry of Family, Women and Children of the Federal Republic of Germany. also the Intergovernmental Agreement on the Sending of German Teachers to Educational Institutions of Ukraine in 1997.

According to the latest agreement, German language teachers are actively involved in teaching German in Ukrainian schools to facilitate the study of German in Ukraine. Over the 20 years of the agreement, more than 1,000 students have received a German language diploma.

Large-scale projects in the field of culture were the Days of Ukrainian Culture in Germany in 2000, Germany in Ukraine in 2003 and 2008, as well as the Week of Ukrainian Culture in Bavaria (Munich) in June 2008, and the Week of Ukrainian of Culture in the Europe Park (Rust. Baden-Württemberg) in October 2008, Ukrainian Film Festival in North Rhine-Westphalia, March 2009, Ukrainian

Film Festival in Bavaria (September 2009), Evenings of Ukrainian Poetry in Berlin , June 2009, the first Ukrainian festival in Berlin “Ukrainale”.

On January 17, 1992, diplomatic relations between Ukraine and Germany were restored through the exchange of diplomatic notes.

Political relations between Ukraine and Germany are developing on the principles of good neighborliness and partnership, as well as due to the common interest of both countries in the stable and peaceful development of Europe as a space of common democratic values.

Cooperation in the political sphere intensified especially against the background of Russia's occupation of the Crimean peninsula, its attempts to destabilize the situation in Ukraine, as well as further military action in the eastern districts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions. Official Berlin supports the efforts of international negotiating mechanisms to resolve the situation in Donbas, the OSCE SMM's activities in Ukraine with personnel, training, technical equipment and financial contributions, and provides assistance to victims of Russian aggression.

The Federal Government is promoting the process of internal transformation in Ukraine and bringing our country closer to the European Union. Relevant provisions, along with providing effective support in restoring the territorial integrity of Ukraine, are enshrined in the program of the German Cabinet of Ministers in force since 2018. Germany provides significant practical assistance (including the Action Plan for Ukraine, targeted programs, humanitarian projects; a total of about 1.2 billion euros) and is the only one of the world's leading countries to delegate government officials to support for priority areas of cooperation (local self-government, privatization and gas transit).

In recent years, Germany has supported the launch of the ProZorro public procurement portal, the establishment of the Energy Efficiency Fund in Ukraine, the development of a public broadcasting system in our country, and the strengthening of civil society.

On July 6, 2020, the Minister of Development of Communities and Territories of Ukraine Oleksiy Chernyshov met with the Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of the Federal Republic of Germany to Ukraine Anka Feldguzen.

During the meeting the parties discussed issues related to:

- reforms of local self-government;
- regional policy for the period 2021-2027;
- Germany's support for the transformation of coal regions.

It was agreed that Germany would consider supporting the transformation of coal regions at the request of the Ukrainian side after a vision of the development of the coal industry as a whole is formed.

Canada recognized Ukraine's independence on December 2, 1991, the first Western country at the time and the second after Poland. Diplomatic relations between Ukraine and Canada were established on January 27, 1992.

Ukraine and Canada are united by long-standing friendly relations. Canadian politicians are actively supporting democratic change in Ukraine since the victory of the Revolution of Dignity, contributing politically, financially and technically to important reforms in our country. After the illegal annexation of Crimea by Russia and the beginning of the aggression in Donbas, Canada has consistently supported Ukraine both within the framework of international organizations (UN, OSCE, NATO, G7) and bilaterally. Canadian officials have repeatedly issued statements condemning Russia's policy against Ukraine and reaffirming Canada's position on non-recognition of the illegal annexation of Crimea, support for Ukraine's sovereignty and territorial integrity, and more. Since the beginning of 2014, bilateral dialogue at the highest and highest levels has significantly intensified. On July 28, 2020, a meeting was held with the Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of Canada to Ukraine Larisa Galadza.

During the meeting the parties discussed issues related to:

- results of decentralization;

- regional policy priorities for the period up to 2027;
- introduction of gender equality in the sphere of policy of the Ministry of Regional Development.

The Canadian side expressed support for the reforms and announced plans for a new project in the field of regional development and support for regional investment.

The news of Merkel's arrival came quite unexpectedly, and there was no certainty that the chancellor would arrive in Kyiv on the eve of the Crimean Platform summit. This testifies to the urgency of the visit, and also complements the general picture of intensification of German-Ukrainian relations, which we have seen over the past few months.

The military-political escalation on the part of the Russian Federation in April this year raised the issue of resolving the conflict in eastern Ukraine. Contacts between Kyiv and Berlin became more intense: the issue of arms supplies from Germany to Ukraine was raised, the initiative to organize a meeting between V. Zelensky and V. Putin appeared, the "Steinmeier formula" and the "cluster plan" returned to the public space. were put in a long box in 2020. Angela Merkel's visit to Ukraine will be both a broad political gesture of support ahead of the Crimean Platform summit, where the Ukrainian government wants to see a significant presence at the highest level, and an attempt to change the Ukrainian-German agenda under its rule.

Merkel's visit gives us another reason to reflect on the prospects of bilateral German-Ukrainian relations, as the authors of the analytical note have repeatedly written on the Wave and VoxUkraine websites. This material continues these studies.

Three issues are currently key for the two countries: energy security, the Russian-Ukrainian conflict and the future format of relations between Ukraine and Germany, taking into account the Bundestag elections and transformations at the level of international politics.

- Nord Stream 2 and energy relations

Energy has recently been of particular concern to political and analytical circles in Kyiv and Berlin. According to many Ukrainian observers, the recent agreements between Germany and the United States on Nord Stream 2 reflect Berlin's "anti-Ukrainian position." News of a compromise provoked a backlash in Kyiv.

Germany is still the main lobbyist in the EU for the construction of a second direct submarine gas pipeline from northwestern Russia to northeastern Germany under the Baltic Sea. Such a policy of Berlin is seen in Kyiv as extremely negative and even treacherous. Along with some other decisions of Berlin, such as its support for the return of the previously expelled Russian delegation to the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe in 2019, Nord Stream 2 has become a major stimulus in German-Ukrainian relations. To many in Central and Eastern Europe, Germany's two agreements with Russia on two streams across the Baltic Sea appear to be somewhat similar to the infamous Munich Agreements of 1938 and the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact of 1939. In these two fatal geopolitical agreements, the most powerful states in Europe sacrificed their sovereignty and the lives of the weaker Slavic and Baltic peoples for their own, as it turned out, profoundly selfish interests.

However, the ultimate effect of this sad event on the prospects of close cooperation between Germany and Ukraine should not be overestimated, for at least three reasons.

First, there is no certainty that the pipeline will eventually function exactly as the Kremlin intended. It is unclear to what extent even the fully completed Nord Stream-2 can play its obvious geopolitical role for Moscow. Due to the growing negative attitudes towards this project in the West, the completion of the project may be either postponed or limited. Although business support from continental Western Europe remains high, there has been considerable skepticism about Nord Stream 2 among various political and intellectual leaders in the United States, the European Union, Eastern Europe, and, in part, Germany. Thus, the full functioning

of the pipeline - at least in the form in which Moscow imagines it - has not yet been resolved.

Second, even if the pipeline starts operating in 2021-2022, it will remain a highly politicized project. Prior to the completion of the first Nord Stream gas pipeline in 2012, the political implications of the new pipeline between Russia and Germany were discussed only by a narrow circle of experts. Western European and especially German politicians, experts and diplomats have not yet publicly acknowledged the link between laying the first line of the pipeline and reducing economic interdependence between Russia and Ukraine.

It can be argued that the completion of the first Nord Stream in 2012 facilitated the Kremlin's decision to use military force against Kyiv in less than two years, annexing Crimea and launching a hybrid intervention in Eastern Donbass. If future research shows that the completion of Nord Stream was indeed one of the preconditions for Russia's armed attack on Ukraine in 2014, it will call into question much of Germany's recent policy toward Russia, and especially Germany's social democratic Ostpolitik (Eastern policy) after cold war.

The Nord Stream-2 project differs from the first in that it became highly politicized before it became operational. After West Siberian gas begins to flow through the second pipeline to Upper Pomerania, public debate and criticism of the project is likely to continue. This will be especially relevant if the start of operation of Nord Stream 2 is accompanied by an escalation of the Russian-Ukrainian conflict. Against the background of the high controversy of Nord Stream-2, Germany and the EU may now have no choice but to cut supplies of Russian energy to the Baltic Sea in the event of a new Russian attack on Ukraine. The risks of such a scenario for Gazprom may already be being considered or will be considered in Moscow. Therefore, they may have a deterrent effect on the Kremlin.

The same ambiguity and politicization exists regarding the economic consequences of the future operation of Nord Stream-2. Will gas imports from the EU continue through the Ukrainian gas transportation system, and how significant

will the reduction in Ukraine's revenues from lost gas transmission fees be? The issue of weakening not only Ukraine's geopolitical position, but also its financial and economic situation as a result of Nord Stream-2 gas supplies - in contrast to the period before the completion of the first Nord Stream pipeline - is already being debated among European experts.

Whatever the specific budgetary and social consequences of the start of Nord Stream-2 gas transit for Ukraine, these consequences will become pan-European and even pan-Western. Given the ongoing heated debate over the role of Nord Stream 2, in Russia's hybrid war against Ukraine, even the non-military consequences of the pipeline's operation will be politicized, if not moralized. The EU and especially Germany will remain under pressure to at least partially compensate Ukraine for the negative economic consequences of Nord Stream-2.

And last but not least: the two Nord Stream gas pipelines are not all in German-Ukrainian relations. They are the result of a combination of two historical factors unrelated to Germany's current political preferences. In the early 2000s, Kyiv rejected Berlin's attempt to create a Ukrainian-German-Russian consortium to jointly modernize Ukraine's gas transportation system. If this project had been implemented then, there would probably be no Nord Stream gas pipelines today. Second, both pipelines are closely linked to the identity of Gerhard Schroeder, who already promoted the first submarine pipeline as federal chancellor in 2005. Schroeder is no longer actively involved in politics and is partially branded by the German public.

Two Nord Stream projects are the result of Ukraine's lost opportunities and Germany's blunders. They are a legacy of another period, not symptoms of deeper flaws in Ukrainian-German relations, which have also been characterized by many positive developments over the past 30 years, if not more. Although the two Nord Stream pipelines will continue to complicate relations between Kyiv and Berlin for many years to come, they do not necessarily have to fundamentally damage them. Schroeder's behavior was the exception (though not the only one) rather than

typical of the German political class. Now, against the background of his work for the Kremlin, he has even become unpopular in the ranks of his own SPD party, as well as in the wider German left.

Energy security and the outstanding issues of the recent German-American agreement on Nord Stream 2 are likely to be one of the key topics of talks between Berlin and Kyiv during Merkel's August 22 visit. Most likely, the Chancellor of Germany will raise the issue of partial compensation to Ukraine for the launch of the pipeline. This opens up an opportunity for both countries to reach a relative compromise, to try to agree on a common position on the future of the pipeline and thus partially smooth out the contradictions in bilateral relations in recent months ahead of the Federal Bundestag elections.

- Donbass, Crimea and the fate of the "Norman talks"

Another important issue that will be raised during Angela Merkel's visit is the situation in Donbas and the settlement of the conflict. After the Paris Summit in the format of the "Quartet of Normandy" in 2019, there was no significant progress in resolving the conflict in eastern Ukraine. The attempt to introduce the "Steinmeier formula" into Ukrainian legislation, as France and Germany wanted, ended in political upheavals and protests from the active part of the Ukrainian public. The Cluster Plan, presented by Berlin and Paris in the autumn of 2020, has also not yet been implemented, remaining only on paper.

However, after the Putin-Biden summit and the agreement between Germany and the United States on Nord Stream 2, there has been a tendency to return to the above-mentioned political initiatives. As there are still no alternative formats for resolving the conflict, apart from the Minsk agreements, all parties are in favor of them. Against this background, there is a return to the public sphere of the "Steinmeier formula" and the "cluster plan", which for European mediators is an attempt to break the negotiations on Donbass from the deadlock.

It is possible that Angela Merkel's trip, first to Moscow and then to Kyiv, will be an attempt to put Russia and Ukraine back on the negotiating table, persuade

Volodymyr Zelensky to try to introduce Steinmeier's formula into Ukrainian law again, and the Kremlin to make big concessions. issues of the "cluster plan" and the implementation of the Minsk agreements. After all, at least some progress on the eve of the German election would be a good farewell maneuver for Merkel, who has played a crucial role in the mediation effort in the Berlin-Moscow-Kiev triangle for the past seven years.

European partners are not benefiting from the stagnation of the negotiation process, which could lead to its gradual erosion and collapse, or the escalation of the conflict in eastern Ukraine, as demonstrated by the EU's sharp response to Russia's military escalation in April this year. The best option for Berlin would be to implement the Minsk agreements and resolve the conflict using the "Steinmeier formula", which, however, is currently impossible due to the rejection of this option by a large part of the Ukrainian public. There is either an attempt to find another way to resolve the conflict (based on existing initiatives, of course, in the absence of others), or a prolonged freeze on the conflict with the possibility of a long-term truce. However, it is unclear how realistic the latter option is, given Russia's reluctance to freeze the conflict for a long time and Moscow's unreliability in implementing part of Minsk-2 in the field of security.

- Politics, elections and the rise of the "green"

Finally, the third issue of the German-Ukrainian order is the principled format of further relations between the two countries, taking into account the latest changes. The Nord Stream 2 agreement has disappointed many Ukrainians who belong to the ruling forces in Berlin. This has led to a decline in Merkel's popularity in Ukraine and the search for new political forces in Kyiv that Ukrainian politicians and observers say are more pro-Ukrainian in their policies (or at least rhetoric) about Ukraine's interests and conflict with Russia.

All German parties touch on the topic of Ukraine in one way or another and have a position on this issue. And recent events have even actualized the Ukrainian direction for them, both politically and in the pre-election sense. Here it is

important to consider the positions of various German political parties participating in the elections, their programs and ratings, as well as the position on Ukraine to better understand their moods and perceptions of the Ukrainian issue, as well as chances to enter parliament and form a coalition.

1. As of 18TH August 2021, the Conservative Party of the Christian Democratic Union (CDU / CSU) is gaining about 25% in the polls.

The CDU / CSU program focuses on climate protection, technical innovation and digitalisation. However, the CDU / CSU does not indicate in its program how they intend to achieve climate neutrality (particularly with regard to CO2 emissions). The party continues to emphasize the link between the economy and climate protection. The CDU / CSU presented a program that they consider socially balanced and offers a way to develop a climate-neutral industrial country without losing jobs. In a pandemic, they offer tax breaks for companies and do not allow tax increases. As for the attitude towards Ukraine, their candidate for chancellor Armin Lashet generally supports Kyiv's position on the occupied territories, calling the annexation of Crimea a violation of international law. At one time, his election as party leader in January 2021 was met with some concern in the Ukrainian press. Armin Lashet's statement about the impossibility of Ukraine's accession to the EU was a cause for concern. Some Ukrainian observers see Lashet as a supporter of close ties with Russia, and his statements in support of the completion of the Nord Stream 2 pipeline have been mixed. However, in June 2021, Lashet stated that this project should not be implemented at the expense of Ukraine. In his first official telephone conversation with Volodymyr Zelensky in January 2021, Armin Lashet assured the President of Ukraine that Germany supports the ceasefire in Donbass and the decisions of the "Norman format" summit in Paris.

2. The left-liberal Union 90 / Greens party is ahead of the Social Democrats (SPD) in opinion polls and ranks second after the CDU / CSU. As of August 18, 2021, it is gaining approximately 20% of the vote.

For the first time in history, the party decided to nominate its candidate for chancellor in the federal election. The reason for this is the high ratings of the party in the polls since 2018. The main topic in the "green" program is environmental policy. The greatest achievement of their work is considered to be the law on Germany's renunciation of nuclear energy. The complete shutdown of German reactors is scheduled for the end of 2022. The party also wants to reduce greenhouse gas emissions by 70% by 2030 and stop burning coal by 2038. One of the most discussed items of the program is to increase the cost of gasoline by at least 16 cents per liter by 2023 and the abolition of short flights on the European continent in order to reduce CO2 emissions.

As for Germany's role in the European Union, the Greens are in favor of a "united and strong EU." EU countries need to work particularly closely together on environmental, migration and security issues. The party wants to revitalize transatlantic relations and strengthen the alliance with the United States, especially in the areas of ecology, cybersecurity, trade and health care. As for Germany's military involvement in the conflict zones in the Middle East, the Greens will remain committed to their original anti-war and anti-nuclear policies of the 1980s. They continue to speak out "for peace, disarmament, security through cooperation and a culture of military restraint." However, they have a tough policy towards Russia and China. For example, they oppose the commissioning of the Nord Stream-2 gas pipeline.

As for Ukraine, a member of the Green Party, Robert Habeck, was very active. He visited Kyiv on May 27, 2021, and spoke in favor of possible arms supplies to Ukraine (contrary to statements by the German government and other parties). The leader of the Greens, who is running for chancellor, Annalena Burbock, has repeatedly called for Ukraine's membership in the EU and NATO, but noted that this could happen only after the stabilization of Ukraine's politics and economy. During her speeches, Burbock often expressed support for Ukraine

in light of the conflict with Russia and called for increased pressure on Moscow. In this context, she is one of the fiercest critics of the Nord Stream-2 project.

3. As of August 18, 2021, the center-left Social Democratic Party of Germany (SPD) is gaining 19.1%.

The party's program is to protect the climate, increase the number of jobs, justice. All this is presented under the motto "Future - respect - Europe". One of the goals of the party's program is climate neutrality (zero CO₂ emissions) no later than 2045 and climate protection as an engine of employment development. The tax on renewable energy sources should be reduced, and the price of CO₂ for heating should be charged to homeowners. The SPD wants to make agriculture and trade more environmentally friendly and social.

As for Ukraine, party leader Olaf Scholz has repeatedly raised the issue of occupied Crimea, calling it a "huge problem" that continues to support the tense situation in eastern Ukraine. He considers the Nord Stream-2 project exclusively from an economic point of view. At the same time, he is actively promoting Ukraine's involvement in joint hydrogen development projects with Germany.

4. 4. The Liberal Free Democratic Party of Germany (FDP) is gaining 11.9% as of August 18, 2021.

For the FDP, freedom means less government intervention in the economy. Therefore, the refusal to raise taxes, as well as interaction in the markets of free private producers and free individual consumers is the basis of their program. The FDP also supports a free market economy in protecting the climate. Accordingly, the policy should determine how much CO₂ can be consumed per year. Revenues from CO₂ prices will be distributed among the citizens of Germany.

As for Ukraine, the party leader Christian Lindner's comments focused on Nord Stream 2. He called for an immediate halt to Russian gas supplies through the pipeline if Moscow blackmails Kyiv with gas transit.

5. As of August 18, 2021, the right-wing populist Alternative for Germany (ADG) party is gaining 10.6%.

The main points of the ADG party's election program are: Germany's withdrawal from the EU (they believe it is easier to ensure national security), oppose the reception of refugees in Germany and criticize the government's tough measures to combat the pandemic (against lockdown and mandatory medical masks).).

The issues of relations between Ukraine and Germany during this election campaign in the party were not particularly raised in public discussions. However, when the party emerged in German big politics, it was perceived in Ukraine largely as a negative phenomenon due to Euroscepticism and calls for closer relations with Russia.

- Long-term positive trends

Academic Ukrainian studies, as well as the analysis of Ukraine by think tanks, are still underdeveloped in Germany. However, the last 7 years have seen a marked improvement in the situation compared to the situation before the Maidan revolution. Since 2014, the number of relevant publications and conferences on Ukrainian issues has increased. The Viadrina European University in Frankfurt an der Oder (near Berlin) and partly located in the Polish city of Slubice has recently become Germany's main center for the scientific study of Ukraine. Among other things, the Department of Transnational History of Ukraine has been established in Viadrina, headed by the prominent historian Andriy Portnov from the city of Dnipro. The university has also started holding annual international summer schools for Ukraine, a special scholarship program for Ukrainian graduate students has been running for several years, and invited lecturers from Ukraine teach at the university every year.

Other German public universities, including the universities of Berlin, Munich, Regensburg, Bremen, Leipzig, Jena, and Greifswald, have maintained or expanded their teaching and research in the history, politics, and culture of Ukraine. Many higher education institutions are expanding their cooperation with Ukrainian universities with the assistance of the German Academic Exchange Service (DAAD). A number of German think tanks on international relations, such

as the Berlin Institute for European Policy (IEP), have recently shown a special interest in Ukraine and provided platforms for complex analytical discussions on Ukraine. Several large German-funded German research, culture and development organizations, including the Reconstruction Loan Corporation (KfW), the International Cooperation Corporation (GIZ), the Goethe Institute (GI), the Konrad Adenauer Foundation (KAS) or the Friedrich Eber Foundation (FES), also intensified their participation in Ukraine after the Euromaidan.

In particular, since 2014, the German Development Agency GIZ has intensified its activities in Ukraine in such areas as energy saving, environmental protection, support for internally displaced persons and good governance. The particularly large EU-funded GIZ project, co-managed with the Swedish agency SIDA, supports Ukraine's decentralization reform through the Program for Empowerment, Accountability and Local Government Development in Ukraine, and is known by the acronym U-LEAD with Europe. The program supports the creation of new integrated territorial communities across the country, as well as the implementation of several sectoral reforms.

- East of the Greens as a new chance for Ukraine

Of all the political and other developments described above, the rise of the German Greens and their entry into the Ukrainian socio-political space is perhaps the most important trend. For Kyiv, the growing public support for the Soyuz 90 / Greens political party has been the most significant positive trend in Germany over the past few years. Once a small force in Berlin, the left-liberal Green Party is now regularly ahead of the Social Democrats in opinion polls and second only to the Christian Democrats in the party landscape in Germany.

The Green Party is also playing an increasing role in West Germany's regional policy and has recently begun to make significant inroads into East Germany's land parliaments. Thus, the Greens have every chance to significantly increase their faction in the Bundestag in the next federal elections scheduled for 2021.

Given the recent changes in the electoral mood of German voters, the Greens could get about 20% of the vote. If that happens, the emergence of this new factional group in Germany's next parliament will mean that they will join the next federal government.

Given the high concern for minority and women's rights, the Greens are particularly critical of Putin's imperialism, authoritarianism, machismo, clericalism and traditionalism. However, for some similar reasons, the German federal and parliamentary Greens have not yet found significant party and political allies in post-Soviet Eastern Europe, including primarily Ukraine. The conservative, national and anti-ideological ideologies of the pro-democratic forces in the republics of the former USSR have made their rapprochement with left-liberal Western European parties, including various green groups, a difficult task.

Since the German Greens have already undergone 30 years of cooperation with Ukraine since the 1986 Chernobyl disaster. In the last decade, the so-called "realistic" wing of the Greens (ie realists as opposed to radicals but pacifist fundamentalists) and affiliated with the Heinrich Böll Foundation have taken an increasingly open pro-Ukrainian stance, especially after the Maidan events of 2013-2014.

Among some German Greens, the emancipatory aspect of the Revolution of Dignity is seen as somewhat similar to the impulses of the West German student protests of 1968, which launched the Greens, and the East German anti-communist uprising of 1989-1990. Since the last revolution in 1993, the current alliance of the West German Green Party with the opposition Alliance 1990 (Bündnis 90) from the late GDR has emerged.

Until recently, one of the highest-ranking "green" politicians showed a special interest in Ukraine. Harms left the European Parliament in 2019, but continues to be actively involved in Ukrainian affairs. Like Harms, two other German Green veteran politicians, Marie Louise Beck and Ralph Fuchs, have already left high politics. However, in 2017, Beck and Fuchs founded the pro-

Atlantic and anti-authoritarian think tank LibMod: Zentrum Liberale Moderne (Center for Liberal Modernity) in Berlin. Thanks to its unpopular events and special reports, not least on Eastern Europe, LibMod is already attracting the attention of German politicians and intellectuals.

Since 2018, a special project on Ukraine has been underway, involving the website *Ukraine verstehen* (Understand Ukraine), which publishes a short weekly analysis of current Ukrainian events in German.

In addition, an active group of young pro-Ukrainian politicians and activists continues the line previously taken by Harms, Beck and Fuex in the German and European parliaments, as well as in the Heinrich Böll Foundation. In the Bundestag, among others, Omid Nuripur and Manuel Saracin pay special attention to Ukraine. Recently elected German Green MEPs Viola von Cramon and Serhiy Lagodinsky in the European Parliament show special interest and sympathy for Ukraine after the Euromaidan.

Thus, most political parties in Germany have touched on the topic of Ukraine in one way or another, which means that relations between the two countries will continue to develop actively after the autumn elections. However, one cannot fail to mention the mild criticism of Ukraine expressed by the leaders of the "traditional" parties, Armin Lashet and Olaf Scholz, for example during the June 26 candidate debates.

However, the most pro-Ukrainian position is taken by the Greens, who have recently become a "new discovery" for Ukraine amid great disappointments in recent months (the government's refusal to supply arms to Ukraine, agreements with the United States on Nord Stream 2, calls to invite Vladimir Putin to summit with the EU, talks on easing sanctions against Russia and other stories that are very painful in Kiev).

The growing popularity of the Greens in Germany is good news for Kyiv, which will allow Ukraine to develop relations with this part of German politics. In this context, Angela Merkel's visit on August 22 may also be related to the desire

of the German leadership to smooth over sharp corners in the CDU's relations with Ukraine, enter into a new political dialogue with Kyiv, outline areas of cooperation so that the Chancellor can pass the dossier in a predictable state so that it is not intercepted by political opponents, such as the Green Party.

The relevant body for development policy cooperation is the Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development. Other ministries also support projects in Ukraine.

The priority areas of German development cooperation are to promote activities in the following areas:

- energy efficiency;
- sustainable economic development;
- democracy, civil society, public administration and decentralization.

In fact, since 2014, with the provision of intensive support to internally displaced persons, another, fourth priority area has been formed.

Cooperation outside the priority areas includes support for sustainable crisis management (protection of the population in emergencies), as well as the continuation of current projects in such areas as health and nature protection.

Germany is one of the largest bilateral donors in Ukraine. In addition, more funds are allocated through multilateral organizations. There are many different programs and projects. Many representatives of public and private institutions also work in the field of development cooperation.

Many projects are implemented through contractors who are government organizations: GIZ (German Society for International Cooperation) and KfW (Credit Institution for Reconstruction). Political foundations, private and church organizations and charitable institutions are also active in Ukraine in the field of development cooperation.

The role of the German Embassy in this extensive network of development cooperation is to coordinate cooperation between the German and Ukrainian governments in the field of development cooperation, as well as to coordinate and

facilitate the exchange of information between different actors on the ground and in coordination with other donors.

- Microprojects

The German Embassy in Ukraine annually provides support to selected micro-projects aimed at improving the living conditions of vulnerable groups. These are projects that are implemented over a short period, usually up to three months, and do not lead to periodic commitments of the Embassy. Necessary equipment for projects is purchased in Ukraine. Salaries, fees, travel expenses, consumables, electricity, gas, heating, etc. are not included in the financial support, but are covered by the project partner independently

2.2. Cooperation in the field of culture, science and technic and interaction with the Ukrainian community.

Cooperation between Germany and Ukraine in the field of science and technology is very diverse. The partners on the Ukrainian side are mainly groups of researchers from institutes of the National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine and universities. On the German side, the partners are universities, large research institutions of the Helmholtz Foundation, institutes of the Max Planck and Fraunhofer Research Societies, the Society. Leibniz, as well as private enterprises.

Most of these German-Ukrainian projects are supported by the relevant ministries and agencies of both countries through funding for scientific exchanges. Cooperation also takes place outside of state support: in addition to officially registered projects, there are also informal contacts, such as private invitations by German scholars to Ukrainian colleagues, which result in joint projects. Meetings of the Working Group on Scientific and Technical Cooperation with the participation of the Federal Ministry of Education and Research and the Ministry of Education and Science of Ukraine identify common priorities and attract new partners from various research fields to cooperative research projects.

Bilateral projects on scientific and technical cooperation, as well as projects to support reforms in the field of scientific research in Ukraine are financially supported by the Federal Ministry of Education and Research of Germany and the Ministry of Education and Science of Ukraine.

Intensive cooperation in almost all areas of basic research is complemented by applied development projects in the following areas:

- materials science and physical and chemical technologies;
- nanosurveys, nanotechnologies and nanobiotechnologies;
- research in the field of health care and medical technology - information and telecommunication technologies.

Ukraine has been one of the priority countries of the CPC since 2014. This year the support program "Enhancing Cooperation with Civil Society in the Eastern Partnership and Russia" was launched, which has been steadily intensifying since 2016 and includes seven target countries (Azerbaijan, Armenia, Belarus, Georgia, Moldova, Russia, Ukraine). From the total budget, which grew from the initial 4.75 million euros to 17 million euros in 2018, the share of bilateral and multilateral projects with Ukrainian partners or in Ukraine accounted for 46% to 65%. Among the projects started in 2015-2017, the largest share belongs to projects in Ukraine - from 48% to 77%.

The Action Plan for Ukraine for 2015 laid down the "operational contribution of the federal government to the reconstruction and sustainable stabilization of Ukraine." The action plan identifies five priority areas for cooperation, among which civil society, education, science and the media form a single unit. Specific goals in this area are to strengthen exchanges between civil society organizations, expand language and cultural work, promote Russian-language and Ukrainian-language media, and conduct trainings for journalists.

The mediation organizations of the ZKOP have been working in Ukraine consistently since Ukraine gained independence in 1991. Therefore, the changes related to the status of Ukraine as a priority country since 2014 should be

considered not so much in terms of structure, but in terms of content. Since 2014, the cultural arena has expanded thematically, becoming more differentiated and political. In addition, topics such as urban development, ecology, feminism or participation in public life on the ground are increasingly reflected in art and culture. A new variety of themes and actors is reflected in the work of German cultural mediators.

- German cultural and educational projects in Ukraine

The Goethe-Institut (GI), which opened its office in Kyiv in 1993, works in the field of German language teaching, international cultural cooperation and support for Ukrainian cultural civil society. Through cultural centers, German language schools, reading rooms and teaching materials centers affiliated with the Goethe-Institut, as well as in partnership with three German-Ukrainian cultural societies - the Bavarian House in Odessa, the Nuremberg House in Kharkiv and Gedankendach Center (literally: roof of thought) in Chernivtsi - GI is also present in the regions of Ukraine and cooperates with local cultural figures - especially with the new generation. GI regularly participates in Ukrainian book fairs, such as the Lviv Publishers' Forum and the Kyiv Book Arsenal.

The German Academic Exchange Service (Deutscher Akademischer Austausch Dienst, DAAD) has had an information center in Ukraine since 1998. Sixteen associate professors, teachers and assistants simultaneously taught German and German at Ukrainian universities in 2019. DAAD also co-finances a joint master's program in German and European studies at the Department of Political Science of the Kyiv-Mohyla Academy and the Institute of Political Science of the University of Jena. Friedrich Schiller in Thuringia, as well as teaching law in German at Kyiv National University. Taras Shevchenko. A number of other cooperation projects in German-Ukrainian higher education are being funded, in particular through the DAAD East-West Dialogue (since 2016) and the Eastern Partnership programs. In addition, DAAD encourages short-term international academic exchanges on mobility programs.

The Institute for International Relations in Stuttgart (Institut für Auslandsbeziehungen, IFA), founded in 1917, is involved in the development of German minorities in Central, Eastern and South-Eastern Europe, including Ukraine. Of the 15 IFA programs, at least six are related to Ukraine. Deutsche Welle (DW) has been stepping up its work in Ukraine since 2014. It has a permanent office in Kyiv and a Ukrainian office in Bonn. The Deutsche Welle Akademie (DWA) promotes journalism and press freedom in Ukraine and improves the skills of journalists in Kyiv in cooperation with the Independent Association of Broadcasters (NAT).

- Study of Ukraine in Germany

The coalition agreement of the German government in 2013, even before the crisis in Ukraine, provided for the strengthening of scientific expertise in Eastern Europe. The unpreparedness of many European countries for the historical events taking place in Ukraine since 2014 has once again highlighted the lack of sufficient competence on Eastern European issues in Germany and other countries. Against this background, the Center for Eastern European and International Studies (Zentrum für Osteuropa- und internationale Studien, ZOiS) was established in Berlin in October 2016, focusing on social change, conflict dynamics, migration, youth, political economy and integration - Ukraine plays important role.

However, most German universities still lack faculty with at least partial specialization in Ukraine. Rich in traditions, the Ukrainian Free University (Ukrainische Freie Universität, UFU) in Munich is a small Ukrainian-language institution of higher education. Although the UFU has emerged from years of isolation in recent years, it has remained on the periphery of German academic and public discourses.

Today, there is no institution in Germany whose public profile is at least partially similar to that of the Ukrainian Research Institute at Harvard University in Cambridge or the Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies at the University of Alberta in Edmonton. The German Association of Ukrainians (Deutsche

Assoziation der Ukrainisten, DAU) and the German-Ukrainian Commission of Historians (DUHK), established in 2015, act as platforms for academic research and scientific information, but are rarely visible to the general German the public.

However, Ukraine has become a much more popular object of study since 2014 and is attracting more and more attention in Eastern European studies. The institutional coordinators of such academic projects involving Ukraine are, for example, the Institute for Historical Research of Central and Eastern Europe. Herder in Marburg, the Giessen Research Center for Eastern Europe (GiZo) or the Institute for the Study of Eastern and South-Eastern Europe. Leibniz in Regensburg. Viadrina European University in Frankfurt-on-Oder hosts an annual summer school dedicated to Ukraine, and the Eastern European Research Center at the University of Bremen, in collaboration with various partner institutions, publishes an analytical bulletin, Ukraine-Analysen.

However, the closure of some other institutions, such as the East-West Research Center (OWWZ) at the University of Kassel or the Departments of Eastern European History at the University of Cologne and the Catholic University of Eichstätt in Bavaria, shows that the decline of German competence in Eastern Europe which began before the events of 2014, is partially ongoing. There is still no systematic Ukrainian research and teaching in Germany, as in Canada or the United States.

So far, there is no notable Ukrainian institute in Germany, no noteworthy German social science and humanitarian center in Ukraine. In turn, there is no German-language university in Kyiv, such as the Budapest University (Andrássy Universität) or Almaty (Deutsch-Kasachische Universität), the German Institute of History, the Warsaw Institute of History (DHI Warschau) or the Moscow University (DHI Moskau), and the German -European Research Center, both in Wroclaw (Willy Brandt Zentrum für Deutschland- und Europastudien) or in St. Petersburg (Zentrum für Deutschland- und Europastudien). The public weight of the Kyiv Dialogues (Kyjiwer Gespräche) and the German-Ukrainian Forum

(Deutsch-Ukrainisches Forum, DUF) is significantly lower than, for example, the St. Petersburg Dialogue or the German-Russian Forum (Deutsch-Russisches Forum).

- Sources of information about Ukraine in Germany

Instead, up-to-date analytical information on Ukraine is provided mainly by non-university institutions such as the Institut für Europäische Politik (IEP), the Center for Liberal Modernity (Zentrum Liberale Moderne, LibMod) and the ZOiS in Berlin, as well as political foundations and the German Foreign Policy Association. Gesellschaft für Auswärtige Politik (DGAP) and the Science and Policy Foundation (Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, SWP). For example, the IEP runs irregular so-called Ukrainian breakfasts (Ukraine-Frühstücke) in Berlin, and since 2019 has set up the German-Ukrainian Researchers Network (GURN). LibMod supports, among other things, the authoritative website "Understand Ukraine".

Only the above-mentioned Viadrina University in Frankfurt-on-Oder has significantly developed academic Ukrainian studies in recent years. Today, it has several interrelated initiatives concerning Ukraine, such as the Ukrainian Professor and the Summer School, as well as a scholarship program for Ukrainians. For several years now, the university has been implementing the project of additional professional education "Ukraine Calling", which was sponsored until recently by the Foundation "Robert Bosch".

- Civil society and sister cities

Numerous German-Ukrainian friendship and aid communities, rooted in the 1990s and sometimes earlier, as well as cultural and socio-political organizations and initiatives, support a diverse transnational network. There are currently 21 Ukrainian cultural associations in Germany. They were founded by Ukrainians in Germany for networking and cultural work. These associations often provide humanitarian and - especially after Euromaidan - political support to Ukraine.

Associations such as MitOst e.V., founded in 1996 by former Eastern European lecturers from the Robert Bosch, or the European Exchange (Europäischer Austausch), both in Berlin, support the German-Ukrainian dialogue with various initiatives, most notably the new Kyiv Dialogues. In recent years, a number of new projects have been funded under the above-mentioned program of the Federal Ministry of Foreign Affairs "Enhancing Cooperation with Civil Society in the Eastern Partnership and Russia". In 2014-2017, a total of 116 projects with a budget of at least 50,000 euros were implemented under this program.

The Ukrainian-German twinning is often supported by the German Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development. There are currently 37 formal town-twinning agreements between Ukraine and Germany, eight of which have existed since the 1980s. As part of this partnership, many Ukrainian cities, hospitals and orphanages have been equipped. Cultural, student and language exchanges have also expanded since the early 2000s.

Since 2001, the semi-state agency "Servicestelle Kommunen in der Einen Welt, SKEW" in Bonn has been responsible for advising and supporting local authorities, and since 2012 it has been part of the non-profit association Engagement Global gGmbH. As part of the Municipal Partnership with Ukraine project, founded in 2015, SKEW supported existing and new twinning projects with a budget that grew from 17.5 thousand euros in 2015 to 760 thousand euros in 2017. The proposed SKEW "Quick Start Package Ukraine" in 2017 and 2018 helped German-Ukrainian inter-municipal relations at the initial stage. Since 2008, German-Ukrainian city conferences of twin cities have also been held initially by representatives of civil society, and since 2016 mainly by SKEW. Conferences not only serve to share experiences, but also promote direct cooperation and interpersonal relationships.

At the same time, in the occupied territories in eastern Ukraine and Crimea, there is an ambivalence of town twinning as a cultural tool. It is mainly aimed at establishing contacts with civil society that go beyond diplomatic or administrative

relations. These relations are not only increasingly asymmetric, as since 2014, humanitarian aid to Ukrainian cities directly affected by the war in Donbass has become increasingly important. In some of Germany's partnerships with cities in Crimea, interpersonal contacts have sometimes experienced the consequences of shifting borders that are contrary to international law. The partnership between Yalta and Baden-Baden, for example, has been continued by civil society - as a result of which, since 2014, reciprocal visits and joint projects have been carried out partly illegally and without the support of SKEW.

3. IMPROVEMENT OPTIONS FOR COOPERATION BETWEEN UKRAINE AND GERMANY

3.1. Proposals for improving trade and economic relations between Ukraine and Germany

Germany is a leading investor in the economy of Ukraine and Germany. The need to diversify the export of Ukrainian products was one of the key motivations for the development of the Export Strategy ("road map" of strategic trade development) of Ukraine for 2017-2021. Thus, the document pays considerable attention to the search for promising world markets and compiles a rating of such markets with the highest potential; EU countries took the leading place in the ranking. Germany, as the "economic core" of the European Union, was chosen as Ukraine's first trading partner for an analytical review in order to provide appropriate recommendations for the release of new goods or revival of trade in Ukrainian goods already available on the German market. Thus, by conducting quantitative, mostly econometric analysis, as well as the use of methods of descriptive statistics and literature review, this study analyzes the German and Ukrainian markets, trade relations between partner countries and the potential for their activation.

During the bilateral meeting in Kyiv, the President of Ukraine and the Chancellor of Germany discussed a wide range of issues of bilateral cooperation. The President of Ukraine thanked the German side for supporting the reforms being carried out in Ukraine.

The President reminded that at his request the Government of Germany had decided to send to our country the Special Envoy for Government Reform and Decentralization Georg Milbradt. "And I want to emphasize that the successful

decentralization reform is continuing and being implemented, thanks in part to the efforts of Germany and German advisers. For the second year in a row, he is cooperating very successfully with Ukrainian

The Government, together with the Ukrainian Ministry of Regional Development, also emphasized this today, "the President said.

He also said that the visit of the Secretaries of State of the Government of Germany took place last week, which was also used to deepen cooperation between the two countries and their governments. The head of state also noted the growth of trade between our countries. According to the President, during today's talks it was agreed to hold the 10th meeting of the Ukrainian-German High-Level Group on November 28 in Berlin. "I am convinced that this meeting, together with the third Ukrainian-German Economic Forum, will further consolidate the growing dynamics of cooperation between Ukraine and Germany," said the President.

Investments in the automotive industry are developing most dynamically, the Head of State said. "All four years we have opened the production of components on the conveyors of the German automotive industry and today created tens of thousands of new jobs," said Poroshenko and called on German businessmen to invest in other industries.

"At the same time, we urge German investors to take a closer look at other areas of Ukraine's economy and regions with high development potential," he said. The President also noted that Ukraine welcomes the signing of an agreement on the opening of local offices of the German Society for International Cooperation (GIZ GmbH) and the Credit Institution for Reconstruction (KfW), which provides a legal basis for expanding financial and technical assistance needed to address critical issues. . "During one of her visits, Ms. Chancellor stressed the decision of the German Government to provide loans of 500 million euros to support the Ukrainian economy, and today I voiced a proposal, which was accepted that part of these funds should be used for a loan to build the Zaporozhye-Mariupol road. our priority is and remains the development of the infrastructure of the liberated

Donbass. And I am very pleased with the support that the Chancellor has shown in this direction. "

The Federal Chancellor, in turn, reminded that Germany has allocated 490 million euros since 2014 for the development of Ukraine, in particular for the benefit of internally displaced persons and for the development of social infrastructure in eastern Ukraine.

"I am very glad to speak today about our readiness to allocate additional funds in the amount of almost 85 million euros. To improve the employment prospects of young Ukrainians through vocational education and housing, "said Angela Merkel.

At the same time, she noted the progress in bilateral agreements between Germany and Ukraine. "Our government agreed on a social security agreement just yesterday," the chancellor added.

The German Chancellor also stressed the importance of continuing reforms in Ukraine and noted some successes, in particular in terms of health care reform, the work of the Anti-Corruption Bureau, decentralization and more.

Speaking about cooperation between Germany and Ukraine in the field of science, the Chancellor said that her country plans to significantly increase funding for the development of this field.

"We will create a center of excellence worth 2 million euros. It is very important that scientists have a chance to stay in Ukraine, not to go abroad and do a great job, "she said.

Ukraine and Germany are at different levels of economic development, but both countries are very open to international trade and may benefit from the intensification of trade relations. Since January 1, 2016, when the Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Agreement (DCFTA) with the EU entered into force, there has been a positive trend in bilateral trade between the countries. Today, key items of Ukrainian exports to Germany include electric machines, agricultural products, clothing and knitwear, ores and slags, metals, wood and wood products.

At the same time, the structure of Ukrainian exports to Germany is still insufficiently diversified, and the export potential is not fully used. This study, based on data analysis, identifies the sectors of the German economy that are most dependent on imported goods, and in which the Ukrainian manufacturer can find its niche. The study also identifies the most promising groups of Ukrainian goods for export to Germany, which belong to the priority areas identified by the Export Strategy. In addition, the aim of the Strategy is to increase the export of knowledge-intensive innovative products.

Thus, the prospects of such goods are determined by several criteria: 1) the presence of identified relative advantages in Ukraine and the absence - in Germany; 2) the presence of significant potential to increase exports to the European market, namely to Germany, based on an assessment of the lag of current exports from potential ("non-bargaining"). According to the same principle, the prospects were calculated for a wide range of product groups, without limitation to belonging to those areas identified in the Export Strategy. The total "non-bargaining" (difference between actual and potential trade volumes) between Ukraine and Germany revealed by the gravity model estimate is \$ 500 million in 2016 or 35% of total exports from Ukraine to Germany in the same year. Thus, according to the structure and intensity of export flows in the world, Ukraine has the potential to increase trade in goods that are already exported to Germany and goods that are not yet supplied by Ukrainian companies to this market. In particular, the work identifies sectors of the German economy that are promising for the integration of Ukrainian partners as suppliers of intermediate goods. Accordingly, the most import-dependent sectors in relative terms are: • Manufacture of coke and refined petroleum products • Manufacture of textiles, clothing and leather products Summary Report 5 • Manufacture of chemicals and chemical products • Manufacture of rubber and plastic products • Manufacture of basic metals • Manufacture of basic metals consumer, electronic and optical products. At the same time, the largest contribution to the value of imported

intermediate goods is made by German exports of:

- Cars, trailers and semi-trailers
- Machinery and equipment
- Chemicals and chemical products, Coke and petroleum products
- Base metals.

In other words, Ukrainian exporters supplying products to these sectors have significant potential to increase integration into German and, consequently, European and world production chains. Practice shows that the integration of Ukrainian exporters is already observed in these sectors, and after the entry into force of the DCFTA with the EU, new opportunities for its expansion have emerged. In particular, new production facilities are being opened that produce electrical and other equipment (wire systems, cables, etc.) for global automotive concerns. Today in Ukraine there are production facilities of German companies Leoni, Elektrokontakt (produce electrical equipment), Bader (seat covers) and others. Also, according to the methodology (identified comparative advantages and "non-bargaining", estimated by gravity model) and the list of goods of the Export Strategy of Ukraine, the study assessed a list of 67 product groups at HS6 level (Table 2), which are promising for Ukrainian exporters. According to these 67 promising product groups, the estimated insufficient trade volumes (undertrade) are \$ 21.5 million. US, while the actual volume of exports in these categories for the same period amounted to 7.2 million dollars. (non-trade significantly exceeds the actual exports of these items).

The largest volumes of "non-trade" were recorded in

- Mechanical engineering products :

- Electrical conductors with connecting devices
- Automatic washing machines
- Gas turbines
- Liquid dielectric transformers
- Coaxial cable
- Tugs
- Refrigerators

On December 17, Ukraine and Germany signed a framework agreement on financial cooperation. Such an agreement defines a list of projects agreed to be financed by the Government of Germany during the Ukrainian-German negotiations for the period 2011-2019.

The agreement provides for the provision of preferential credit resources * in the amount of up to 214.6 million euros, which will be used to implement investment projects, including to support municipalities, including:

- in the field of energy (modernization of substations and integration of the Ukrainian energy system into the European integrated energy system);
- support for small and medium enterprises;
- implementation of energy efficiency measures in public buildings (schools and kindergartens);
- reconstruction of communal infrastructure in the regions.

In addition, the Agreement provides for the provision of up to 40 million euros on a gratuitous and non-refundable basis - in the form of grants, of which 30.5 million euros will be used to improve the vocational education system and strengthen local self-government in Ukraine.

The Minister of Finance of Ukraine Serhiy Marchenko thanked the Government of Germany, the Embassy of Germany in Ukraine, the Credit Institution for Reconstruction (KfW), and personally the Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of Germany to Ukraine Ms. Antsi Feldguzen for support of Ukraine's economic development and long-term cooperation.

According to Serhiy Marchenko, the signed Agreement between the governments of Ukraine and Germany on financial cooperation will create legal preconditions for accelerated preparation of projects and transition to their implementation.

He also expressed confidence that the new model proposed by the German side for the preparation of Ukraine's development projects, on which agreements

were reached in 2011-2019, will help simplify the procedure for concluding certain credit and grant agreements.

At the signing ceremony, Anka Feldguzen stressed that this Agreement lays a solid international legal basis for further cooperation between Germany and Ukraine in the field of finance and development policy. In this way, Germany continues to support major reforms in the areas of decentralization, vocational training and energy efficiency.

Ukraine and Germany are at different levels of economic development, but both countries are very open to international trade and may benefit from the intensification of trade relations. Since January 1, 2016, when the Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Agreement (DCFTA) with the EU entered into force, there has been a positive trend in bilateral trade between the countries. Today, key items of Ukrainian exports to Germany include electric machines, agricultural products, clothing and knitwear, ores and slags, metals, wood and wood products. At the same time, the structure of Ukrainian exports to Germany is still insufficiently diversified, and the export potential is not fully used. This study, based on data analysis, identifies the sectors of the German economy that are most dependent on imported goods, and in which the Ukrainian manufacturer can find its niche. The study also identifies the most promising groups of Ukrainian goods for export to Germany, which belong to the priority areas identified by the Export Strategy. In addition, the aim of the Strategy is to increase the export of knowledge-intensive innovative products. Thus, the prospects of such goods are determined by several criteria: 1) the presence of identified relative advantages in Ukraine and the absence - in Germany; 2) the presence of significant potential to increase exports to the European market, namely to Germany, based on an assessment of the lag of current exports from potential ("non-bargaining"). According to the same principle, the prospects were calculated for a wide range of product groups, without limitation to belonging to those areas identified in the Export Strategy. The total "non-bargaining" (difference between actual and

potential trade volumes) between Ukraine and Germany revealed by the gravity model estimate is \$ 500 million in 2016 or 35% of total exports from Ukraine to Germany in the same year. Thus, according to the structure and intensity of export flows in the world, Ukraine has the potential to increase trade in goods that are already exported to Germany and goods that are not yet supplied by Ukrainian companies to this market.

In particular, the work identifies sectors of the German economy that are promising for the integration of Ukrainian partners as suppliers of intermediate goods. Accordingly, the most import-dependent sectors in relative terms are:

- Manufacture of coke and refined petroleum products
- Manufacture of textiles, clothing and leather products Summary Report
- Manufacture of chemicals and chemical products
- Manufacture of rubber and plastic products
- Manufacture of basic metals
- Manufacture of basic metals consumer, electronic and optical products.

At the same time, the largest contribution to the value of imported intermediate goods is made by German exports of:

- Cars, trailers and semi-trailers
- Machinery and equipment
- Chemicals and chemical products, Coke and petroleum products

• Base metals. In other words, Ukrainian exporters supplying products to these sectors have significant potential to increase integration into German and, consequently, European and world production chains. Practice shows that the integration of Ukrainian exporters is already observed in these sectors, and after the entry into force of the DCFTA with the EU, new opportunities for its expansion have emerged. In particular, new production facilities are being opened that produce electrical and other equipment (wire systems, cables, etc.) for global automotive concerns. Today in Ukraine there are production facilities of German companies Leoni, Elektrokontakt (produce electrical equipment), Bader (seat

covers) and others. Also, according to the methodology (identified comparative advantages and "non-bargaining", estimated by gravity model) and the list of goods of the Export Strategy of Ukraine, the study assessed a list of 67 product groups at HS6 level (Table 2), which are promising for Ukrainian exporters. According to these 67 promising product groups, the estimated insufficient trade volumes (undertrade) are \$ 21.5 million. US, while the actual volume of exports in these categories for the same period amounted to 7.2 million dollars. (non-trade significantly exceeds the actual exports of these items).

The largest volumes of "non-trade" were recorded in :

- Mechanical engineering products
- Electrical conductors with connecting devices
- Automatic washing machines
- Gas turbines
- Liquid dielectric transformers
- Coaxial cable
- Tugs
- Refrigerators
- Electric heaters.
- Food industry products
- Butter and milk fats
- Alcoholic beverages

Despite the complexity of regulation and the still small amount of estimated non-trade for certain promising sectors of Ukraine's Export Strategy, export diversification is very important for long-term economic growth, so the development of these areas of trade is a priority. Following the abolition / reduction of EU import duties under the EU-Ukraine Association Agreement on DCFTAs, customs duties do not currently create significant restrictions on the export of these goods to the EU. Instead, duty-free restrictions in the form of

technical regulations, sanitary and phytosanitary measures, geographical indications, licensing, etc. is a major barrier to bilateral trade. Thus, "non-bargaining" can be explained, in particular, by the negative effects of various non-tariff barriers (both at European and national level) or other factors, such as non-competitiveness (in price or quality) of Ukrainian goods compared to similar goods from other countries. countries, excellent tastes and preferences of German consumers, features of cooperation with trade companies / associations, specific requirements of trade networks, etc. Thus, harmonization of Ukrainian regulation with European regulation in accordance with the Association Agreement with the EU will help reduce duty-free barriers and existing differences in regulation, simplify the export of goods from Ukraine to the EU.

3.2. Prospects for interparliamentary cooperation between Ukraine and Germany

Ukraine is not on the list of Germany's main trading partners. In 2018, it ranked 42nd in the world in terms of imports from Germany and 45th in terms of exports to Germany. On the other hand, Germany is one of the main places in Ukraine's foreign trade. In 2018, Germany was the fifth largest market for Ukrainian exports (4.7% of all Ukrainian exports) and the third largest market for Ukrainian imports (10.5% of all imports to Ukraine). The largest commodity groups of Ukrainian exports to Germany, namely at the level of two signs of the harmonized coding system - HS2, are Electrical Machinery (18.7% or 23.4%) 2, Seeds and fruits of oilseeds (15.6% or 13, 0%), Ores, slag and ash (7.4% or 6.8%), Metals (4.2% or 8%), Cereals (6.7% or 5.1%), Clothing (6, 6% or 4.6%) and Wood and wood products (5.5% or 5.0%) (Figure 14). The top 15 most exported products

to Germany in 2018 at the more disaggregated level, at the HS6 level, include spark plug wiring kits, feather or rapeseed, iron ore and concentrates, corn, electrical switches and switches, pipes and tubes. profiles, light industry products (men's pants, overalls) (Table 1). The amount of exports in the top 15 groups is \$ 1.3 billion, or 57% of total exports of goods, which indicates a high concentration of exports.

The largest commodity groups of Ukrainian imports from Germany are nuclear reactors, boilers, machinery (17.0% or 21.7%), mineral fuels; oil and products of its distillation (16.3% or 1.9%), Means of land transport other than rail (11.8% or 13.5%), Electrical machinery (8.5% or 9%), Pharmaceutical products (6 , 2% or 6%), Plastics, Plastics (5.9% or 5.8%) and Miscellaneous Chemicals (4.2% or 6.3%) (Figure 15). Compared to 2013, imports from Germany to Ukraine decreased by 12%. First of all, imports of mechanical engineering products decreased: nuclear reactors, boilers, machinery - by 10%, land vehicles - by 32%, electric machines - by 11%; imports of pharmaceutical products decreased by 36% (Figure 17). At the same time, exports of Ukrainian products to Germany increased by 38% during this period, due to the reorientation of Ukrainian exports due to the deep and comprehensive free trade agreement between Ukraine and the EU and limited access for Ukrainian exports to Russia. First of all, we are talking about the products of mechanical engineering, agriculture and raw materials. As for mechanical engineering products, exports of electric machines increased by 42%. In agriculture - exports of oilseeds increased by 251%, grain exports by 157%

As Germany is a member of the European Union, trade relations with Ukraine are governed by the same legislation for all member states. A comprehensive agreement covering political and economic cooperation with Ukraine is the Association Agreement, which includes provisions on the Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area (DCFTA) between Ukraine and the EU. The provisional application of the Agreement began in autumn 2014, and the Agreement fully entered into force on September 1, 2017. Accordingly, in the

framework of the DCFTA in the spring of 2014, the EU unilaterally abolished 94.7% of import duties for Ukraine³. Ukraine has to gradually abolish its import duties over 7 years from 2016. The long-term goal is for Ukraine and the EU to abolish 99.1% and 98.1% of import duties, respectively. Industry. At present, duties have been abolished for 94.7% of commodity groups exported from Ukraine. For some, there are transition periods from 3 to 7 years starting in 2016, namely for certain wood products, fertilizers, mineral products, aluminum products, footwear, copper products and chemical products.

Ukraine immediately abolishes customs duties on 49.2% of industrial goods; the transitional regime will apply to certain mineral products, fertilizers, organic products of the chemical industry, car tires, leather goods and textiles⁴. The agreement provides for special protective measures for the automotive industry of Ukraine, which will be valid for up to 15 years from the date of entry into force of the agreement. Agriculture. Ukraine will abolish import duty rates on 88.5% of customs items, including 50% immediately. For other goods there is a transition period of up to 7 years. On the other hand, for some goods (8.7%) import duty rates will not be abolished completely - they are subject to a linear reduction for 5-10 years with fixing the residual levels of import duty rates. Tariff quotas will be applied to 2.8% of positions. The EU abolished import duties on the vast majority of goods from Ukraine in April 2014 in the regime of autonomous trade preferences for Ukraine⁵. At the same time, the EU applies a policy of tariff quotas to certain groups of Ukrainian exports of agricultural and food products - grain, honey, eggs, dairy products, poultry, sugar, etc. In general, the EU has set duty-free tariff quotas

EU for 36 product groups from Ukraine, and for 4 tariff quotas set additional volumes. There are also planned increases in volumes for 5 years for 18 tariff quotas. In addition, on 1 October 2017, temporary additional autonomous EU trade preferences for Ukraine entered into force, including an increase in tariff quotas for 18 Ukrainian goods and the abolition of EU import duties on several industrial

goods⁶. Ukraine, in turn, has established duty-free tariff quotas for 3 types of goods from the EU - pork, poultry and sugar. Opportunities for duty-free exports to the EU under tariff quotas are used by Ukrainian exporters with varying intensity. After the abolition / reduction of customs barriers, the main factor limiting Ukrainian exports will be non-tariff regulation - technical regulations, sanitary and phytosanitary measures, licensing requirements, etc. Non-tariff restrictions on imports are set by German foreign trade law, EU law or international conventions. In general, non-tariff measures applied by EU member states meet the general requirements of the EU. However, many EU member states have their own list of goods subject to import licensing. For example, Germany has an "Import List" (Einfuhrliste, annex to the German Foreign Trade Act). For each individual group of goods, you can find out about the current import duty rates, taxes, product requirements, and other conditions of export from Ukraine to the EU on the EU Trade Helpdesk¹⁰ website. The main technical requirements for non-food products relate to product safety, standardization, packaging and labeling, as set out in the Harmonized EU legislation (sectoral and horizontal), which includes, inter alia, directives and harmonized standards. Sectoral directives approve essential requirements for the safety of certain types of products and are binding and provide a presumption of conformity with the essential requirements of the directives. If a manufacturer does not meet harmonized standards, it is his responsibility to prove that his technical specifications meet the essential requirements of the Directive, which may be a more difficult task. The highest requirements are for industrial products that are subject to mandatory certification and CE¹¹ marking (these products are considered to pose a high risk to the public interest and include such products as: pressure equipment, electrical equipment, elevators , machines, measuring instruments, equipment for use in explosive atmospheres, etc.).

Confirmation of compliance with EU requirements for the export of these industrial products to the EU, in particular, includes: preparation of a technical file, appointment of an authorized representative of the company in the EU (EU

resident - importer, distributor, etc.), testing products in EU certified certification centers, registration of the declaration of conformity, drawing of marking of CE. In accordance with the Association Agreement (Article 56 of Chapter 3 "Technical Barriers to Trade", Chapter IV "Trade and Trade-Related Issues"), Ukraine has committed itself to gradually ensure compliance with EU technical regulations and standardization systems, metrology, accreditation, conformity assessment and market surveillance work. The transition to technical regulations recognized in the EU member states and in other countries of the world will reduce non-tariff barriers to trade, improve access of Ukrainian industrial products to markets and stimulate exports¹². The Association Agreement with the EU also stipulates that Ukraine must implement the administrative and institutional reforms necessary for the conclusion of the Agreement on Conformity Assessment and Acceptance of Industrial Goods (ACAA Agreement) with the EU. The conclusion of the ACAA Agreement will ensure mutual recognition of certificates of conformity between Ukraine and the EU in established industrial sectors, and industrial goods from Ukraine will be able to be placed on the EU market without additional tests and verification procedures in the EU. EU food safety is ensured by sanitary and phytosanitary measures. In the framework of the Association Agreement, Ukraine must bring its national legislation on sanitary and phytosanitary measures closer to the European one. To this end, Ukraine has adopted a Comprehensive Strategy for the Implementation of Chapter IV (Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures) of Chapter IV "Trade and Trade-Related Issues" ¹³, which should be implemented within 5 years until 2021. This reform involves the adaptation of more than 200 EU directives and regulations.

Namely, light industry, fine arts, traditional culture, spare parts and components for the aerospace and aviation industries, mechanical engineering, food and processing industry in terms of finished food, food ingredients, deep processing, organic products. In order to identify promising product groups for export to Germany from the above categories, a multi-stage analysis was performed according to the

following scheme. Trade in identified product groups was further analyzed for the effect of customs and non-customs restrictions. • In the first stage, a comparison of the identified relative advantages of Germany and Ukraine at the level of HS619 (NRCA index) was made. According to this criterion, goods were selected that have relative advantages in Ukraine and, conversely, do not have relative advantages in Germany.

CONCLUSIONS

Today's relations between Kyiv and Berlin have been severely damaged by Nord Stream 2 and other German policies towards Moscow, which are considered compliant in Eastern and Central Europe. Currently, Ukraine is concerned about three issues in its relations with Germany: energy security, the settlement of the conflict in Donbass and the further format of cooperation after the elections to the Bundestag. Despite the complexity of each of them, none of these issues is a critical threat to German-Ukrainian relations. Despite the Nord Stream-2 agreement, Germany sees Ukraine as an important partner in its plans to develop a hydrogen strategy, and is ready to discuss compensating Kyiv for Nord Stream-2 losses. Most German political parties are ready to discuss this. In addition, long-term trends in the West in general and in Germany in particular point to rapprochement rather than further divergence between the two countries in the medium term. While Ukraine's full accession to NATO or the EU, and even the adoption of simple accession plans, remains remote, bilateral relations with some Western countries remain important for Kyiv. In particular, the conflict in Donbass remains a priority of Germany's foreign policy. Although the election campaign in Germany is more focused on discussing internal problems in the country and the issue of occupied territories does not sound as often as before, German politicians

agree on the need to continue working to achieve at least some "progress" in the Donbass situation. This will be the focus of Angela Merkel's visit. The relatively favorable situation in the field of cultural exchange contrasts with the stagnation in Ukrainian academic research and the lack of an updated concept of the SCOP and its role in Ukraine's transformation process. However, the number of joint research projects in German-Ukrainian scientific cooperation has been growing since 2014, and academic mobility is increasing. Institutionally, however, little has changed. It is possible that the much higher degree of institutionalization, visibility and influence of various German institutions in and in Russia - compared to the few significant German organizations specializing in Ukraine - has led to insufficient adjustments to Germany's old so-called "Eastern policy" after the historic 2014 events. Such inertia applies not only to Nord Stream 2, but also to a number of other key issues, such as Russia's status in the Council of Europe or Ukraine's EU membership prospects, where, at least from Kyiv's point of view, Berlin is slowing down rather than helping to promote Ukrainian interests.

On the other hand, the dynamic development of German-Ukrainian cultural and civic exchange since 1991 and especially since 2014 shows the high potential of existing relations. After Euromaidan, Ukrainian-German relations became much more differentiated. In German political discourse, the history and destiny of Ukraine are now relatively important topics. By early 2021, what many had feared since 2014 had not happened: Germany had not grown tired and turned away from Ukraine after years of futile attempts to resolve the conflict with Russia. Increasing German attention to Ukraine in the future should lead to the institutionalization of existing expertise, ideas and networks. This could happen, for example, with the establishment of the Ukrainian Institute in Berlin and the German Center for the Humanities and Social Sciences in Kyiv. Such institutions would provide Ukrainian-German relations with a longer-term basis and increase their public perception. Such institutionalization would also affect German policy and diplomacy towards Ukraine over time. As a result of historical events since 2014

and their active public discussions, Ukraine is no longer a "white spot" on the German mental map. Nevertheless, the public impact of solid knowledge of Ukraine is still too weak to counter some deep-rooted stereotypes about Eastern Europe and Ukraine's current dominant image as just a crisis country at war.

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SUMMARY

Liashenko A. V.

«Diplomatic relations between Ukraine and Germany: an economic aspect»

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The master's thesis focuses on diplomatic relationships between Ukraine and Germany the context of national development priorities. The main factors which affect on the influencing on international business. The main aim of this research is to recommendations to improve the relationships and bussines between Ukraine and Germany. Keywords: diplomatics, inernational business, international economic growth, social and economic system.

АНОТАЦІЯ

Ляшенко А.В

“Дипломатичні відносини між Україною та Німеччиною – економічний аспект”– Кваліфікаційна магістерська робота.

Сумський державний університет, Суми, 2021 р.

Магістерська робота присвячена дипломатичним відносинам між Україною та Німеччиною в контексті пріоритетів для національного економічного розвитку.

Основною метою даного дослідження є рекомендації щодо покращення відносин та бізнесу між Україною та Німеччиною.

Ключові слова: дипломатика, міжнародний бізнес, міжнародне економічне зростання, соціально-економічна система.